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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
 
1.1 Background to the project 
 
In a series of reports,1 we present the findings of the project, Making Transitional Justice 
Work for Women: Rights, Resilience and Responses to Violence Against Women in 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Northern Uganda and Kenya (Grant ID: G160214). This is a 
summary report of the findings from DRC. The full report provides a significantly more 
detailed discussion.2 Funding for this project was granted by the Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), under the discontinued Australian Development Research 
Awards Scheme (ADRAS) 2012. 
 
The research was designed to investigate transitional justice processes for addressing 
women’s rights and justice priorities in three countries in sub-Saharan Africa: Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, and Kenya. This regional focus reflects the priority 
accorded by the international community to transitional justice, as a means to address past 
human rights violations experienced during civil war and other mass violence, and to promote 
lasting peace and stability. The countries for study were selected because: each has 
transitional justice processes in place; Gender Based Violence (GBV) is significantly 
prevalent in each conflict; and the researchers had existing partners on the ground who could 
facilitate a logistically feasible, meaningful, and culturally- and gender-sensitive research 
process.  
 
1.2 Project methodology 
 
1.2.1 Introduction 
 
This research sought to identify women’s priorities for justice, their experiences when 
seeking justice, and both enabling factors and obstacles in justice processes, in the three focus 
countries. Justice was defined in a fluid, broad, and holistic way to include legal, health, 
economic, social, and psychological elements (Olsen et al. 2010b, 983; Fischer 2011, 412; 
Szablewska and Bradley 2015, 261). The project has developed a rigorous, reliable, and 
substantive evidence base of the experiences, views, and opinions of women affected by 
violence in the research sites. The project entailed researchers travelling to multiple locations 
within each country, including major regional towns and villages in remote and difficult to 
access areas. This was done to enable women who are rarely, if ever, able to participate in 
research, consultations, and decision-making processes to contribute to this project.  
                                                
1 Rita Shackel and Lucy Fiske, “Making Justice Work for Women: Kenya Country Report” (August 2016) 
http://opac.library.usyd.edu.au:80/record=b5334992~S4; Lucy Fiske and Rita Shackel, “Making Justice Work 
for Women: Uganda Country Report” (August 2016) http://opac.library.usyd.edu.au:80/record=b5336181~S4; 
Rita Shackel and Lucy Fiske, “Making Justice Work for Women: Democratic Republic of Congo Summary 
Report” (August 2016)  http://opac.library.usyd.edu.au:80/record=b5365440~S4; Rita Shackel and Lucy Fiske, 
“Making Justice Work for Women: Kenya Summary Report” (August 2016) 
http://opac.library.usyd.edu.au:80/record=b5365443~S4; Lucy Fiske and Rita Shackel, “Making Justice Work 
for Women: Uganda Summary Report” (August 2016) http://opac.library.usyd.edu.au:80/record=b5365444~S4. 
2 Rita Shackel and Lucy Fiske, “Making Justice Work for Women: Democratic Republic of Congo Country 
Report” (August 2016) http://opac.library.usyd.edu.au:80/record=b5332962~S4. Please see the full DRC 
Country Report for references cited in this summary report. 
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The extensive fieldwork, conducted over a two-year period and engaging 274 women 
affected by violence, provides unique insights into women’s access to justice, and the 
efficacy of different justice strategies and mechanisms in conflict and post-conflict sites. 
Fieldwork in DRC was conducted in multiple sites in the territories of Goma (along the 
Rutshuru–Nyiragongo axis, and the Masisi–Sake–Bweremana–Kamuronza axis) and Bukavu 
(along the Hombo–Bunyakiri axis, and the Kalehe–Minova axis); a total of 113 women in 
eastern DRC participated in the research – 41 through individual interviews and 72 through 
focus group discussions. Women participants were married, cohabiting, never married, 
separated, divorced, and widowed, and most also had children (ranging from 1–12 births); 
their education levels were also varied (ranging from no education to diploma level), but the 
majority had no formal schooling. These insights are extended further by both individual, 
semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with 68 key informants (28 in DRC), 
including: community leaders, health and non-governmental organisation workers, police, 
prosecutors, court, judicial officers, and international experts.  
 
1.2.2 The research questions  
 
The research addressed the following key research questions: 
 
1. What do women in northern Uganda, Kenya, and eastern DRC identify as their 
priorities in relation to justice? 
2. What efforts have been made to provide justice and rights protection for women who 
have experienced violence in northern Uganda, Kenya, and eastern DRC?  
3. How have women responded to these justice interventions, and what impact have 
these had on addressing women’s rights and justice priorities?  
4. How can transitional justice interventions be adapted to better address women’s rights 
and justice priorities, build resilience, and prevent violence against women? 
 
1.2.3 Key methodological issues 
 
In terms of its epistemology and paradigm, the research is qualitative, feminist, and 
phenomenological. The methodology recognises that the voices of women are often muted by 
social, economic, and political factors (which are further enlivened during war), and then 
systemically embedded in justice processes; thus, the phenomenological method employed 
for this project combines inquiries into individuals’ accounts of a shared experience with key 
informant perspectives, existing literature addressing the histories and justice reforms of each 
country, and other thematic research into gender, human rights, development, poverty, and 
violence. Initially identified themes in the interviews included: legal, economic, social, 
political, and health justice; psycho-social and emotional well-being; traditional and/or 
informal justice mechanisms; roles of women in justice processes; and the effects of justice. 
By melding these insights with secondary research and analysis, a phenomenological enquiry 
can mediate the transition of private experience to public political concern, and thus enable 
the generation of knowledge with relevance beyond the anecdotal.  
 
Furthermore, multidisciplinary and multi-country collaboration enhanced the quality of the 
research. It enabled us to draw on expertise in several different fields, including social and 
legal theory; legal frameworks; qualitative research methods; development work; and 
country- and culture-specific knowledge. 
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1.3 History and context of the conflict and transitional justice in DRC 
 
Women affected by violence in this project were interviewed at multiple sites in eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), within the provinces of Nord-Kivu (North-Kivu) and 
Sud-Kivu (South-Kivu). The sites were chosen in consultation with local stakeholders, to 
ensure that diverse contexts and experiences were captured in the voices of women who 
participated in the research. Stakeholders, including the two provincial ministries of justice as 
well as national and international NGOs, were conscious of including women from areas 
recognised for recurring, brutal, and ongoing waves of violence, and sites where women are 
known to have had limited opportunities to speak about their experiences of violence and 
access to justice. 
 
1.3.1 A snapshot of DRC and its people 
 
DRC is a vast Central African country covering 2,344,858 sq km in size (UN Data Statistics 
2014); it is one of the largest countries both in Africa, and in the world (Cusack 2005, 204).  
DRC today has a population of almost 75 million people (World Bank 2015a), consisting of 
over 450 different ethnic groups (Kasay 2013, 332; Karbo and Mutisi 2012, 381). The 
Human Development Index (HDI) – a standard measure of basic human development 
achievements in a country – places DRC at 186 out of 187 countries (UNDP 2014, 2). The 
majority of Congolese are living in poverty; according to the UNDP, 87.7% of the population 
in DRC live below the income poverty line; 46.2% live in severe poverty; and 15.5% in near 
poverty (2014, 6). According to the most recent DRC Demographic and Health Survey, 8% 
of children under the age of five suffer from acute malnutrition, and 43% suffer from chronic 
malnutrition. Child mortality rates are among the highest in the world (World Food 
Programme).  
 
DRC shares borders with nine nations – Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia – and is thus 
particularly susceptible to multiple cross-border influences, and the impacts of regional 
instability. DRC is known for its rich mineral and natural resources; “[w]ith 80 million 
hectares of arable land and over 1,100 minerals and precious metals, the DRC has the 
potential to be one of the richest countries on the African continent and a driver of African 
growth” (World Bank 2015a). However, foreign countries and corporations have taken 
economic advantage of its unstable conflict situation to extract minerals and other resources; 
militia also have an interest in maintaining disorder, to exploit resources (Banwell 2012, 52).  
 
Importantly, women in DRC are disproportionately the targets of violence, especially sexual 
violence, and experience a multitude of adverse impacts associated with sexual and gender 
based violence (SGBV). Dubbed the “rape capital of the world” (BBC News 2010), rape and 
sexual violence have been extensively used as a tool of domination in DRC, to “terrorise the 
civilian population, enabling … access to and control over regional mines which contain most 
of Congo’s mineral wealth” (Banwell 2012, 47), and as a tool for destabilisation (Meger 
2010). The impunity for sexual violence in DRC is reflected in the large number of 
documented cases of sexual violence perpetrated by the military itself; this arguably has 
served to further normalise rape (Trenholm et al. 2011, 149), and contributed to the rise of 
civilian perpetration of sexual violence in DRC (Bartels et al. 2010, 38). 
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Clearly, management of its natural resources must be a priority in rebuilding and 
development in the DRC. Post-conflict rebuilding and development of effective modalities 
for transitional justice in DRC is challenged by a number of factors, including inhospitable 
terrain, and severely fractured and depleted infrastructure. Responses to violence against 
women, however, must recognise that the causes of such violence are multifactorial and 
complex. For example, idealised heterosexual masculinities and corresponding normative 
standards are recognised as perpetuating beliefs that men’s “sexual needs” must be satisfied 
(Baaz and Stern 2009, 509), with an attendant belief that there is a right to women’s bodies. 
Although this is exacerbated by the history of poverty and social conditions – which 
manifests itself in sexual violence and, indeed, violence more generally (Baaz and Stern 
2009, 514) – it is not in itself endemic to the DRC; rather, it is informed by contexts of 
militarisation and hegemonic masculinity. 
 
1.3.2 Context of conflict in research sites and surrounding areas 
 
The research was conducted along several axes of Goma and Bukavu. While conflict in 
eastern DRC has been widespread, different townships have experienced diverse cycles of 
violence, with varied tactics employed. 
 
Bukavu 
 
Bukavu is the capital city of the province of South Kivu, with an estimated population of just 
over 800,000 people (MONUSCO 2015b, 1). 
 
The recent wave of conflict in Bukavu can be traced back to the influx of refugees fleeing the 
Rwandan Civil War and Genocide in 1994. Refugee camps were targeted by a number of 
different military and paramilitary groups. Major acts of violence have occurred, including a 
mass rape in 2004 by forces loyal to General Nkunda and Colonel Mutebutsi, and by soldiers 
of the Tenth Military Region under the command of General Mbuza Mabe (HRW 2004, 2–3). 
 
Women and communities in Bukavu have been deeply impacted by the conflict and its 
attendant violence. Evidence suggests justice processes in Bukavu are failing to deliver 
justice to women and the community. International aid agencies have also been criticised by 
some locals for fuelling hardships and injustices within the area; specifically, they were 
criticised for not properly assessing the needs of the local people, exploiting rape survivors as 
a “marketing” tool for money for other projects, and failing to follow up and to be 
accountable (Trenholm et al. 2011, 146). However, the local hospital was praised as a 
significant place for allowing the exchange of information and helping encourage self-care 
for rape survivors (147).  
 
Several community-based NGOs operate out of Bukavu, including Panzi Hospital and Panzi 
Foundation, which serves more than 8000 women a year. 
 
Bunyakiri 
 
Bunyakiri is a remote town in South Kivu, about 70km north-west of Bukavu, and with a 
population of almost 137,000 (ACF International 2009, 5).  
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At various times, Bunyakiri has been occupied by Mai-Mai and Hutu combatants, as well as 
what eventually came to be known as the Front de Libération du Congo. Eventually, Rwanda-
aligned RCD-Goma (comprised of the militarist wing of the original RCD, including former 
ADFL and Congolese Armed Forces soldiers, ex-Mobutuists, and the Bayamulenge Tutsi), 
gained control over a large part of eastern DRC, including the Kivus, from 1998 to 2003 
(Mampilly 2011, 185). Both the RCD and their opposition committed a number of large scale 
acts of violence in the Bunyakiri region. In 1999, the RCD killed civilians and burned homes 
while moving through the northern Bunyakiri region. Rebel groups opposing the RCD 
attacked homes, killed civilians, and committed rapes on a number of occasions throughout 
1999 and 2000, in the Kolonge area of Bunyakiri. 
 
Bunyakiri has also been the site of multiple particularly brutal and well-documented 
massacres, including one committed in May 2012 by the Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR); 37 civilians, including 9 children, were killed on May 9 in 
Kamananga, and 32 civilians, including 6 children, were killed in Lumenje on May 13 
(UNICEF 2012). 
 
Access to justice for the women and communities of Bunyakiri is remote and little 
documented. However, some initiatives have possibly seen results, including work with the 
mobile courts in Bunyakiri (Harris 2012b), and some health initiatives (Seck 2011). 
According to the agencies involved in these initiatives, this work is making a difference in 
women’s lives, and is responding to some of their needs. This is also reflected in what some 
participants told us: “They welcomed me. They gave me a document. They escorted me and 
went to ask for medicines for me at Bunyakiri… they gave me medicines; they also counseled 
and consoled us. Because I was not the only woman there. … This was all free of charge.”3 
 
Bweremana 
 
Bweremana is a small town in North Kivu, with an estimated population of 16,000. Conflict 
in Bweremana raged between affiliates of the DRC national army (FARDC) and RCD-
affiliated forces. Armed civilians also joined the conflict on various sides (HRW 2005). More 
recently, the FARDC occupied Bweremana following the M23’s brief conquest of Goma 
(OHCHR 2013, quoted in Africa Focus 2013). 135 rape cases were reported in the first week 
of the army’s occupation (Christian Aid 2014; HRW 2014a). After the defeat of the M23 
rebellion, many soldiers were effectively dumped in Bweremana; soldiers were transferred to 
military bases, but not before numerous cases of rape and crop looting were reported (HRW 
2014a). Human Rights Watch also reports that, by October 2014, 100 demobilised 
combatants, their wives, and children had died from starvation in camps at the military bases 
outside Bweremana (HRW 2014b); many of the surviving former combatants have since left 
the camps (HRW 2015d). 
 
Goma 
 
Goma is the capital of North Kivu province, connecting to the Rwandan border. 
Approximately 1 million people lived in Goma in 2012 (BBC News 2012). It has been 
described as having an “aid economy” – that is, the influx of a humanitarian presence in 
Goma as a result of the conflict is driving the economy, and creating new jobs and businesses 
(IRIN 2013). 
                                                
3 Interviewed in Bunyakiri, September 25, 2014. 
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Goma was at the centre of the refugee crisis in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, and had 
very similar experiences to Bukavu during the First and Second Congo Wars. It was also one 
of the most intensely fought-over regions during the M23 uprising, and was captured in 
November 2012. Up to 200,000 people were displaced at this time (Rosen 2012), and the UN 
has estimated a further 130,000 fled the region between November 2012 and January 2013 
(Tran 2013). Between March and July in 2013, M23 rebels summarily executed at least 44 
people and raped at least 61 women and girls in the region, reportedly with the support of the 
Rwandan government (HRW 2013). Though M23 was defeated in late 2013, data from HRW 
suggests that more atrocities (including rape and the destruction of homes) have been 
committed by FDLR fighters (HRW 2015a). 
 
Many survivors of violence and victims of crime from across eastern DRC have travelled to 
Goma to try and obtain justice. In 2008, an operational military court was set up in Goma to 
address acts committed by military officers during the course of military operations. 
However, it has faced problems, including insufficient staffing, an inability to conduct 
independent investigations, and an inability to hear high-level prosecutions. There are also 
concerns about whether due process is respected in the court (Bureau of Democracy, Human 
Rights and Labor 2010). Other local criminal justice processes are stifled by under-
resourcing, corruption, and lack of expertise. These broader systemic problems in criminal 
justice in DRC are discussed more fully in Chapter 4. 
 
Minova 
 
Minova is a town in South Kivu province. In 2012, over 47,000 IDPs arrived in and around 
the towns of Minova and Bweremana over a period of two weeks (UNHCR 2012). Along 
with Bweremana, it served as a base for the FARDC during the M23 conflict. 
 
After the fall of Goma in 2012, the Congolese army entered Minova. Violence perpetrated by 
the army continued over several days, including mass rape, pillaging and killings of civilians 
(Enough Project 2014b; Jones and Smith 2012; Reynolds 2015). Al-Jazeera put the number 
of victims of the ten days of rape and violence in Minova in November 2012 at 1000 (Zeyneb 
Alhinadawi 2014). 39 troops involved in these attacks were controversially tried in a military 
court in 2014 (the “Minova trial”), having been accused of raping 130 women; however, only 
two were ultimately convicted (Cordaid 2014). 
 
Five local courts operate in the Kalehe territory, with one situated in Minova, and represent 
important vehicles for justice. However, they are under-resourced and marked by possible 
language barriers (Scheye 2011). Similar problems of under-resourcing and poor accessibility 
to justice processes exist throughout eastern DRC, as further discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
Rutshuru 
 
Rutshuru is located in North Kivu, and is the headquarters of the district Rutshuru Territory. 
It lies within 30km of both the Ugandan and Rwandan borders.  
 
Conflict has occurred sporadically in Rutshuru since at least 1992. This includes an attack 
perpetrated by rebel forces under Colonel Nkunda’s control (HRW 2006), during which 
several towns experienced rapes and looting of civilian property; children were also recruited, 
with boys being forced to fight and girls forced into ‘marriages’ with soldiers (IRIN 2008). 
7 
 
MONUSCO was able to restore peace to Rutshuru in June 2011 (Padovan and Nyangi 2011), 
but the M23 had taken control of Rutshuru by July 2012 (Al Jazeera 2012). The DRC army 
retook Rutshuru in October 2013. 
 
Rutshuru continues to struggle to rebuild a justice infrastructure. 
 
Sake 
 
Sake is a town located in North Kivu, approximately 25km north-west of Goma. In 2004, it 
had an estimated population of about 17,000. 
 
It was attacked by Colonel Nkunda in 2006, with ensuing battles between his forces and the 
Congolese army, causing thousands of residents to free (Gangale 2006). Sake was retaken by 
UN and government troops in November 2006 (IRIN 2006). The M23 rebels also occupied 
the town in November 2012, with attendant and atrocities (including summary executions, 
forced conscription of minors, and other atrocities) (McKenzie and Smith-Spark 2012).  
 
Sake also continues to struggle to rebuild its justice infrastructure. 
 
1.3.3 Transitional justice efforts in DRC 
 
Despite the large UN peacekeeping presence, a new constitution in 2006, and the first free 
elections in 40 years, the government of DRC has had limited success in its transitional 
justice efforts. It still struggles with a failing justice system that cannot combat widespread 
corruption and impunity (ICTJ 2015b). Chapter 4 discusses attempts at institutional reform 
(such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the Ethics and Corruption 
Commissions) and their failings, as well as efforts such as referral to the ICC (expanded on in 
Chapter 4.4.3). 
 
Despite negative views of formal justice in the DRC, many Congolese still believe in the 
possibility of justice and lasting peace (Vinck and Pham 2014). In particular, they seek 
government action in the following areas: fighting corruption; training judges and lawyers; 
paying staff and judges, and informing the population about justice (2014, 67). 
 
Access to justice 
 
For many women in eastern DRC and their communities, it is clear that access to services and 
justice is thwarted by many challenges (UN Secretary-General 2014, 9). These barriers are 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
1.3.4 Conclusion 
 
The conflict in the DRC is ongoing and the situation remains fragile and insecure. Though the 
wars have officially ended, various armed militia groups remain active. The reasons behind 
this are multiple and complex, including: ethnic tensions (Autessere 2010, 7), exacerbated by 
foreign and local economic interests in DRC’s natural wealth (Montague 2002, 104); the 
decimation of traditional economies (Baaz and Stern 2009); and the lack of discipline within 
the army (Baaz and Stern 2008). For women in DRC, the potential threat of resurgence of 
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violence is stifling. The process towards rebuilding DRC is slow and remains a tentative one 
in the face of continued insecurity and lack of strong political commitment and action. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: WOMEN IN DRC SPEAK TO JUSTICE 
 
 
Justice means everyone has a place.4 
 
 
2.1 The research focus 
 
In examining the efficacy of transitional justice strategies for women impacted by violence in 
DRC, this research project asked women participants some broad questions about what 
justice means to them, and how they feel justice is working for women within their 
communities. Understanding how women see justice, its role, and how they experience 
different justice processes, is important to inform development of justice mechanisms and 
strategies that are responsive to women’s needs and priorities for justice; this is especially so 
within the context of communities that are rebuilding, after transitioning from conflict to 
post-conflict states. 
 
This chapter presents their voices alone, so that they are clearly heard and not muted by other 
voices and views; the following chapters situate their voices within broader justice 
discourses. 
 
2.2 Gender in context in the DRC 
 
The women we spoke with in the DRC consistently talked about deeply entrenched attitudes 
within their communities that perpetuated multiple harms and inequalities for women; such 
attitudes led to women and girls being undervalued and often stigmatised, which in turn 
generates feelings of dehumanisation, isolation, and a lack of purpose. The normative values 
and practices that women described as pervasive within their communities were revealed, 
through their own voices, as constituting destructive sites that disenabled women, negated 
their agency, and denied them their status as autonomous rights-bearing individuals: “[I]n 
our culture, women cannot be a leader and cannot talk when the men are there. Women do 
not have rights to anything from her father or her family. When they are sharing the goods of 
her father they are not going to give anything to a lady, to a woman, which is her right.”5  
 
Sadly, some of the women we spoke with seemed resigned to a life of subordination. As one 
woman from Rutshuru explained, “If I’m a woman, I cannot change the situation. I cannot 
change my body, become taller or bigger.”6 This felt domination rendered many women 
impotent and voiceless in their pursuit of justice: “I am good for nothing… I would not have 
any opinion to give about doing this or that.”7 Many women, however, strongly contested the 
subordinate position accorded to women, recognising the increased burden that has been 
                                                
4 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
5 Interviewed in Bunyakiri, September 26, 2014.  
6 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
7 Interviewed in Rutshuru, April 21, 2014.  
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placed on women by conflict, changed gender roles, and changed social structures and norms 
(Lwambo 2011; Ohambe et al. 2005): “Do you think that if you asked a man to carry 
pregnancy and deliver, he will make it? … As a woman, I am the one to carry pregnancy, do 
household work and the husband is still there for his needs even when you are already very 
tired.”8 
 
Multiple sites of female disadvantage and disempowerment were identified by participants. 
Most notably, women talked about economic disempowerment, political invisibility, and lack 
of access to education, legal processes, and other social capital. These are all addressed 
below. 
 
2.3 Women’s lived experiences of violence in DRC 
 
Central to the lived experiences of women in DRC, and their rapport with justice, is the 
reality of widespread SGBV on a mass scale, and a widespread culture of impunity for such 
violence (Ohambe et al. 2005, 9; Meger 2010, 127). Many of the women with whom we 
spoke also recounted devastating histories of dispossession (including of property, land, and 
kinship), and an existence shackled by poverty, insecurity, uncertainty, and fear. Many 
women were struggling with the basic needs of survival: “There’s no food, there’s no 
medicine, there’s nothing.”9 A Rutshuru mother of seven, aged 34, described a precarious 
existence: “You don’t feel safe here you have nothing, nothing. I have nothing, so you just 
have a small thing, and even the small thing they come and steal it, how are you going to be 
secure?”10  Participants also spoke about their bodies, dignity, and spirit being stripped: 
“They had broken my body. I had nothing left. I felt naked and felt I had had all the possible 
troubles.”11  
 
Women commonly recounted living in a state of turmoil and unease – an indicator of their 
unresolved and ongoing trauma (Ohambe et al. 2005, 35). They consistently expressed an 
overwhelming sense of hopelessness, fear, and, for most, a profound desperation with their 
life situation. When describing her typical day, one woman revealed, “I just stay at home, 
sometimes sleep, my mind goes far but what do I do and when I go to bed, I feel pain, weak, 
my body is not good… I don’t know what I can give my children to eat… I just… I don’t know 
what to do.”12 Another woman, in Bunyakiri, depicted a life burdened by bad memories and 
unresolved trauma: “If I hear the sounds of guns, I feel like losing my mind and my heart 
begins beating so fast, and then I collapse.”13 Others also spoke of being tired, and they were 
visibly so – physically, mentally, and emotionally: “I cannot do anything. Even work. I 
cannot… I feel very exhausted. I am sick every day… I am just here enduring my unbearable 
sufferings. That’s it.” 14 An absence of ‘inner’ peace for women was further echoed by many 
of the women, and usually with profound impacts being recounted: “[E]very day I have a 
headache because I think a lot about how I was living with my husband and he abandoned 
me, my kids are not okay, I don’t have peace in my heart and when I start thinking about it, I 
have a fever. I will get a fever and start trembling.” 15  In trying to rationalise their 
                                                
8 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
9 Interviewed in Sake, September 20, 2014. 
10 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
11 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014.  
12 Interviewed in Bweremana, September 20, 2014. 
13 Interviewed in Bunyakiri, September 26, 2014. 
14 Interviewed in Rutshuru, April 21, 2014. 
15 Interviewed in Bweremana, September 20, 2014. 
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experiences, women questioned themselves and the very heart of their communities; one 
woman simply concluded that “people don’t love each other.”16 
2.4 The distance between women and justice 
Against this backdrop of women’s lived experiences, it is thus not surprising that the women 
in DRC overwhelmingly see justice as illusory, elusive, remote, and disconnected from their 
actual lives. Some women wrestled with the profound schism between their experiences of 
mass atrocities and violence, the aftermath, and the possibility of obtaining any justice. 
The dissonance between women’s lives at the moment and any notion of justice rendered 
some women reluctant (maybe unwilling), and some unable, to engage with or 
contemplate the contours of what might possibly be a realisable and more productive 
justice for women. Some women saw justice as clearly beyond the realms of their reach: 
“We don’t know what can change. It is only leaders who know.”17 Other women 
struggled to understand how justice could address their lived experiences, and the complex 
social configurations of power and injustices diffused throughout their society: “Even to jail 
him is useless, to leave him free is equally useless because he is poor, he has nowhere to 
live.”18 For some women, justice in whatever shape was deemed to have already fatally failed 
them: “[T]here is no justice.” 19 
Many women lamented their abandonment at the societal, communal, and political levels. 
This resulted in a profound and unbearable degree of neglect, and an absence of care, 
humanity, and respect. As one woman in Bweramana stated, “They don’t respect me, 
everyone neglected me, just the way they [are speaking] to me, the way I am living in a 
house, I don’t have anything. If I have to eat, I have to go and beg.”20 A woman from 
Minova decried, “The wars destroyed my life … I have been raped. I never have peace in the 
area that I live in and my neighbours they don’t greet me, so I just found out that I am not a 
human being like others.” 21 Another woman described, in particularly stark terms, being 
“a carcass walking in the streets. My spirit is like a thing tormented”.22 For many women, 
this experienced neglect, abandonment, and ostracism symbolises how society (de)values 
them, and evinces the failures of justice for women. It even led some women to speak 
about themselves disturbingly as not only having nothing, but also being nothing: 
“You are neglected so you feel like you are not in this world.”23  
Some women clearly identified the connectedness of broader systemic and societal problems 
as a root cause of their disadvantage and maltreatment. Many women especially recognised 
poverty as a key determinant: “Here in Congo we cannot … help those who are suffering 
because we are all poor. And here in Congo they don’t care about poor people. If you want 
you can die because you are poor; they don’t care about you.” 24 So many of their 
voices made apparent the mutually constitutive nature of gender, poverty, and violence – a 
complex dynamic that justice must recognise and address on multiple levels (Fiske and 
Shackel 2014). 
16 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
17 Interviewed in Minova, September 21, 2014. 
18 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
19 Interviewed in Bweremana, September 20, 2014. 
20 Interviewed in Bweremana, September 20, 2014. 
21 Interviewed in Minova, September 21, 2014. 
22 Interviewed in Minova, April 19, 2014. 
23 Interviewed in Minova, September 21, 2014. 
24 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
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Other women expressed anger at their abandonment, the lack of action on the part of the 
government, and in failed processes of justice: “[W]e have the impression that they do not 
care about women’s rights. They behave as if they have abandoned us. They violate our 
rights.”25 This sentiment was most acute with regards to the clear lack of justice afforded to 
women who have been affected by violence: “the Government does not care so much about 
justice referring as far as rape is concerned. After being arrested because of rape, people pay 
money and get released. This means that we victims of rape have no right.”26 
 
2.5 Women’s views on justice 
 
Many women clearly expressed what justice is, what it should be, and what receiving justice 
would look like for her as an individual woman, and for other women within her community. 
As they did so, a number of strongly recurring themes and key elements emerged. 
 
2.5.1 The pillars of justice 
 
Women who participated in this research collectively identified several key pillars of justice, 
which shape what justice is and what it does (or should do) and what it can deliver to women.  
 
Truth was identified clearly by many women as a key element of justice: “Justice is to say 
the truth.”27 Other women viewed justice as a site for enabling the truth to be told: “We feel 
bad about her situation and the remedy is to help her and support her morally, telling her 
people can still live even after they have undergone situations like hers... She should not 
avoid people. If she sees two – three sitting together she has to join them and seek to get 
advice from them.”28 
 
Many women also identified equality as being central to justice: “[L]et us be brothers and 
sisters without discrimination. That is how things should be. That is more useful.”29 Fairness 
and impartiality were also identified as hallmarks of justice, procedurally and substantively: 
“Everything needs to be done in a right way and agree to have the influence of someone else. 
People need to be punished when necessary regardless of the money they could have.”30 
 
2.5.2 The role of justice for women 
 
Many women talked about justice not as an aspiration or an ideal grounded in principle, but 
rather as a functional tool – a fundamental resource that could serve women for practical and 
positive effect. Most commonly, women characterised justice and its purpose in either 
restorative and/or remedial terms: “My concern is to get back to a normal life as it was 
before to be able to take care of my children”.31 In post-conflict, many women saw justice’s 
role as “bring[ing] people together to bring peace, so you do not fight neighbours and you 
                                                
25 Interviewed in Rutshuru, April 21, 2014. 
26 Interviewed in Minova, September 21, 2014. 
27 Interviewed in Minova, September 21, 2014. 
28 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
29 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
30 Interviewed in Goma, September 26, 2013.  
31 Interviewed in Minova, September 21, 2014. 
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share things with others. And [know] how to live with military and [they know] how to live 
with us.”32  
 
Importantly, women also saw justice as a vehicle for regaining their stature, and for obtaining 
a voice and a place in society. In echo, women explained that “here at home, people always 
say that women have no right to speak among men or in the conference room. But justice 
helps us find a place.”33 From a remedial perspective, women also saw justice as a vehicle 
for reparations and women’s economic empowerment: “To have justice is to be paid what is 
due to you.”34 Being productive, in particular, was seen as an important link to winning 
respect from communities: “I would like to be respected … we are so much neglected. I could 
be respected if I could have small commerce.”35 
 
Some women viewed justice as a pathway towards forgiveness for wrongs done and harm 
suffered. With peace, reconciliation, and rebuilding constituting the most important goals for 
many of the women with whom we spoke, forgiveness was frequently identified as being 
more important than punishment: “I am of the opinion that the only way out is to forgive 
him.” 36  For some, a firm precondition to forgiveness and reconciliation was receiving 
acknowledgment from the perpetrator(s) of their wrong doing, the harms suffered by others, 
and asking for forgiveness; that way, “the chance for them to be forgiven is always there; we 
cannot apply ‘an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth’.”37 Others, however, clearly viewed 
justice as a vehicle for punishment and retribution: “Justice is when someone is 
condemned.”38 For many of this view, the role of justice in meting out punishment was not 
seen merely for its punitive function, but was considered also as important for protection, 
deterrence, and even rehabilitation of wrong-doers: “The perpetrators of rape must be 
punished … they must be taught lessons so that they can stop doing that and so that others 
can learn from there and fear to do evil.”39  
  
Women in DRC almost universally craved a return to pre-conflict life (at least in part), 
reaching to justice to achieve “a speedy end to this war forever and everything can be as 
before, we can be safe as it was before, we can go and dig without any problem. We want our 
children to be able to study.”40 For those women dispossessed and displaced by the conflict, 
justice was a means of restoring stability, security, and identity: “A place to stay with my 
children. That is the most important thing that I’d like to have.”41 Another woman declared 
her simple desire to have “a place to stay or to be buried.”42 These were strongly recurring 
themes – justice was seen as a conduit for reconnecting with their communities and restoring 
“normality.” 
 
Yet other women viewed justice as an instrument for enforcing or protecting their rights: 
“Giving you justice consists in ensuring that your rights are not violated.”43 Again, the vital 
                                                
32 Interviewed in Bweremana, September 20, 2014. 
33 Interviewed in Bunyakiri, September 26, 2014.  
34 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
35 Interviewed in Minova, September 21, 2014. 
36 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014.  
37 Interviewed in Rutshuru, April 21, 2014. 
38 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
39 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
40 Interviewed in Rutshuru, April 22, 2014. 
41 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
42 Interviewed in Minova, April 19, 2014. 
43 Interviewed in Bweremana, April 23, 2014. 
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role seen for rights (as part of justice) in rebuilding women’s lives is clearly apparent. For 
many women, rights were often linked not to a social or political agenda, not to legal 
instruments or authority, but to their basic felt and lived human needs: “My right is to be 
helped.” 44  Justice was also expressed to be a potential leveller in the community, by 
“help[ing] us so that we can be like others.”45 Many women also talked about the role of 
justice in enforcing women’s economic rights. Compensation and reparations for survivors 
were seen to be an important element of the justice response: “We women are neglected 
because of missing financial means. … There is no financial means that life is becoming more 
and more difficult.”46 
 
Women commonly viewed justice as a potent site for opportunity. One theme almost 
unanimously talked about by women was the role of justice in creating pathways for 
education: “And another thing I want to add on the list is someone to take care of my kids, to 
pay for their school fees. I don’t want them to be like me. I didn’t go to school.”47 Justice was 
also conceived as a source or site for opportunity and transformation, to empower women in 
various other spheres of their life both by drawing on the past, and moving into the future: 
“She should also be encouraged to study; send her to school so that she can develop the 
same intelligence as the man does; making her become as powerful … She has to become apt 
to do all things.”48 
 
Ultimately, women saw justice as a pathway towards simply feeling happier, healthier, more 
productive, and (re)connected with their communities: “When justice is done, you feel free … 
and your heart will be at peace.”49 One woman, echoing many, declared, “To feel cured we 
need someone to look after us. This would help start life anew and help ourselves. … This 
wound will not be cured as long as we still eat hardly, and there is no financial means. But if 
one could sit comfortably without being neglected by others this would cure the wound.”50 
 
2.6 Towards greater gender justice 
 
In discussing justice, many women spoke about the barriers to justice for women, and the 
challenges women face in accessing justice. Many women expressed a lack of trust and 
confidence in the institutions responsible for the administration of justice, and in other actors 
that might play a role in delivering justice for women. This lack of trust was not confined to 
the government, but extended to the international community and to NGOs. Often, this lack 
of trust was borne of interactions with organisations that seemed to the women to be 
extractive, giving unfulfilled promises to return and aid women; this created a deep sense of 
betrayal and neglect: “We are both direct and indirect victims when we are involved in 
advocacy.”51 
 
Women described defective systems – processes of justice that lacked accountability, were 
vulnerable to corruption, were not gender sensitive, and simply failed to be responsive to the 
lived experiences of women. Women identified different pathways through which they might 
                                                
44 Interviewed in Bweremana, September 20, 2014. 
45 Interviewed in Minova, April 19, 2014. 
46 Interviewed in Minova, September 21, 2014. 
47 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
48 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
49 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
50 Interviewed in Minova, September 21, 2014. 
51 Interviewed in Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
14 
 
be able to access some form of justice – formal and informal (including traditional) avenues, 
legal and non-legal channels – but overwhelmingly, women viewed justice as disconnected to 
their lives and communities: “[Justice] is not with the people that I’m living with.” 52 There 
was no sense of women’s presence, voice, or current ownership in any sites of justice in 
DRC. 
 
Women time and time again documented their futile attempts in accessing justice: “By 
reporting to the justice institution every day, you will end up saying ‘I am wasting my time: I 
have already been raped and damaged; what then am I killing myself for?’”53 Many women 
expressed extreme frustration and discontent with unresponsive and failing systems of justice 
at all levels: “So what will I go to the International Criminal Court if already at the local 
level I did not get a solution?” Importantly though, in coming together, women recognised 
their power as a collective force: “The solution we found as we discussed altogether, we saw 
that we women have to know our rights and have them respected … Because once we are 
taught them, it requires that we, in our turn, have them respected … [I]t is only after that that 
we can bring about some behaviour change.”54 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: WOMEN’S NEEDS AND PRIORITIES FOR 
JUSTICE IDENTIFIED 
 
 
Women participants in eastern DRC were invited to speak about their justice needs and 
priorities. Although diverse experiences and views emerged, a number of common priorities 
for post-conflict justice and community rebuilding were discerned in the women’s voices. 
This chapter discusses these needs and priorities around six key themes distilled from 
interviews: 
 
• Trauma, health, and well-being 
• Peace, safety, and security  
• Truth-telling and reconciliation 
• Compensation and economic empowerment 
• Equality and protection of women’s rights 
• Justice for children 
 
Discussion in this chapter also draws on key informant interviews, published literature, and 
other materials, to better understand how justice outcomes can be improved for women in 
DRC. 
 
3.1 Trauma, health, and well-being 
 
Women participants in this research overwhelmingly identified restoration of their mental 
and physical health and well-being as a priority for justice. As mentioned above, SGBV 
perpetrated against women is pervasive in DRC; this fact was unanimously attested to by 
women participants in this project. Every participant had experienced some form of sexual 
                                                
52 Interviewed in Bweremana, September 20, 2014. 
53 Interviewed in Rutshuru, April 22, 2014. 
54 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
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violence, and many women told of multiple experiences: “[N]ow I am a member of the 
Associations of people living with HIV as a result of rape because I’ve already been raped 
three times.”55 
 
Recent data from the Standard Demographic and Health Survey for the Democratic Republic 
of Congo 2013–14 revealed that 27% of women in DRC disclosed having ever experienced 
sexual violence, with 16% experiencing sexual violence in the preceding twelve months. 
Beyond conflict-related violence, widespread intimate partner and family related violence 
have also profoundly impacted on Congolese women’s health and well-being (Kidman et al. 
2015; Decker et al. 2015; Peterman et al. 2011): “There are some husbands they go and drink 
and they come back home drunk, you’re the first person they take and then start beating you 
seriously. … Maybe you run away, you skip for some time or he starts talking and you keep 
quiet so they don’t beat you. Because being beaten everyday, that’s not good.”56 
 
The rate of reported intimate partner violence (IPV) in DRC is the highest in the world. The 
number of women reporting intimate partner sexual violence (IPSV) has been placed at 
almost double those reporting rape (Myers Tlapek 2015, 2527; Peterman et al. 2011, 1065); 
this translates into 35% of women in DRC reporting IPSV, compared with 12% in Rwanda, 
and 15% in Kenya (Peterman et al. 2011, 1065). The most recent Congolese national 
demographic and health data indicates that 57% of married women in DRC have ever 
experienced emotional, physical, or spousal violence by a current or former husband or 
partner. Decker et al. (2015, 190–91) also report that 53% of partnered adolescents (15–19 
years) and 64.7% of young adult women (20–24 years) are affected by IPV (physical or 
sexual).  
 
3.1.1 The impacts of violence 
 
The women with whom we spoke in this research described an array of mental, physical, 
health, and social impacts related to sexual violence: 
 
Sometimes you feel like dying because you are ashamed … you feel abandoned, you 
cannot do anything to survive.57 
 
To be raped in my life it’s really changed my life because I cannot even talk in my 
house. Every time I want to talk to my husband, it will be like, keep quiet or follow 
your husband… the one [who] raped you.58 
 
I have become so much older than all the women of my age. I am suffering from 
hemorrhoids these last four days. I did not suffer from that before.59 
 
While the impacts of sexual violence on women are well documented (WHO 2003; WHO 
2002, 147–74; Liebling et al. 2012), there is also an abundance of data sourced directly from 
DRC studies. In a 2005 study in which female rape victims in South Kivu were asked about 
the impacts of rape, 85.4% reported leucorrhoea, 85.6% dyspareunia, 65% dysuria (difficult 
or painful urination), 56.9% dysmennorhea (painful menstruation), 65.2% irregular periods, 
                                                
55 Interviewed in Rutshuru, April 22, 2014. 
56 Interviewed in Sake, September 20, 2014.  
57 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
58 Interviewed in Minova, September 21, 2014.  
59 Interviewed in Rutshuru,  September 22, 2014. 
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and 79.5% lower abdominal pain; over 91% of victims suffered from at least one rape–related 
physical or psychological problem (Ohambe et al. 2005, 39). In Bartels et al.'s study of 1851 
women presenting to Panzi Hospital60 for post-sexual violence care, 22% reported pelvic 
pain, 11% lumbar pain, 7% abdominal pain, and 6% pregnancy (2010, 40–41). Most of the 
women participants who shared details of their sexual violence in the present research 
documented many of these impacts; in particular, women described ongoing problems due to 
genital trauma and HIV/AIDS: “[M]any of the women kill themselves because sometimes 
when you have been raped you are old and you go to the hospital and they tell you that you 
have attained HIV and you decide directly to kill yourself as me, my age, I’m old.”61 
 
Sexual violence is also associated with adverse mental health, social, and economic sequelae 
for women (Brown 2012, 33–5; Babalola et al. 2015, 182). Ohambe et al. (2005, 42) reported 
that 91% of women survivors of sexual violence interviewed in South Kivu had behavioural 
problems, including permanent anxiety, shame and self-loathing, excessive sweating, 
insomnia, nightmares, memory loss, and aggression. Johnson et al.’s study (2010) also found 
that, for those women that had experienced conflict-related sexual violence, 67.7% met the 
criteria for MDD, 75.9% for PTSD, 37% answered “yes” on suicidal ideation, and 32.8% 
answered “yes” to suicide attempts. In our research interviews, many women raped had 
considered leaving their communities due to pervading insecurity and the fear of stigma, 
exacerbating their social isolation and economic disadvantage: “[My husband] lost all the 
value he was giving me and started considering me as a worthless thing… Everyone is 
referring to us as ‘those who were raped.’ We no longer have value in the eyes of the 
community.”62 
 
Women participants in this research said that they were able (generally) to access basic acute 
medical care post-rape in conflict affected areas; for example, the majority of women 
indicated that they were able to access medical treatment (specifically, PEP) within 72 hours 
of being raped. However, some women said that they continued to be fearful about seeking 
medical assistance, due to fears that the rape might be revealed to their husbands, and lead to 
subsequent abandonment and stigmatisation (Scott et al. 2013, e205–7; Kelly et al. 2012, 
290–91): “[T]hey tell themselves that if they go for medical care, their husbands will start 
asking them ‘where did you get these medicines from? How come you are taking them?’ They 
just shut up.”63 
 
Other research, however, suggests that for some women, the barriers in accessing health care 
may be greater than was indicated by women participants in this research. Ohambe et al. 
(2005, 41) reported that 70% of the women who were interviewed in their study did not 
receive any medical treatment after being raped. Kelly et al. (2011, 5), in a study of 255 
women attending a referral hospital (Panzi) and two local non-governmental organisations in 
eastern DRC, also reported that “55% of women stated it took more than a day to travel to 
SGBV service locations; only 4.2% of the women received SGBV services within 72 hours 
of the attack”, and almost half of the women (44.6%) waited for more than a year before 
seeking medical care.  
 
 
                                                
60 Panzi Hospital is a hospital located in Bukavu. Although it is a general hospital, it is known for its work with 
and support of victims of sexual violence. 
61 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
62 Interviewed in Minova, September 21, 2014. 
63 KI FGD, interviewed in Rutshuru, April 22, 2014. 
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3.1.2 Two priorities: Good physical and mental health 
 
Given the far-reaching and profound impacts of sexual violence, it is not surprising that 
women participants in the present research repeatedly identified two priorities as essential for 
restoring women’s well-being, and achieving justice for women: “Women must be in good 
health. Women must have the right to good physical and mental health.”64 
 
The first such priority is the need for accessible, quality, and ongoing medical care, 
particularly for long-term health problems arising from sexual violence. As many women in 
DRC are living in extreme poverty, accessing treatment and medications is difficult due to a 
lack of financial means; a number of women told us that they could not afford travel to 
medical facilities to access specialised health services, such as surgical treatments. Moreover, 
women stated that the ongoing cost of medical care was burdening an already strained 
relationship with their husbands: “what he finds unbearable is to have to pay for my 
treatment.”65 
 
Secondly, the women with whom we spoke in this project unanimously identified the need 
for psychosocial support and trauma counselling as a leading justice priority for the women 
of DRC. Women unanimously stated that, through de-traumatisation, they would “recover 
good health; regain their mental stability, regain respect.”66 Psychosocial support and de-
traumatisation were seen by many women as a path back to “normalcy” and reintegration, 
and as a first step in rebuilding their lives: “If she was de-traumatised, she ends up realising 
that all her problems are over and she feels herself as normal again as other people.”67 
However, most women had, at best, only received ad hoc counselling following an attack. 
Under-resourced and unspecialised services were identified as a problem: “They are just 
ready to talk to me but they are not giving me what I need … The problem is that we don’t 
have any psychologist; furthermore, we need to reinforce counseling houses be well 
equipped!”68 Key informants echoed this; their concerns ranged from counselling houses 
lacking “consumables” which “ensure patients’ transport [and] observation”,69 to the need 
for “counselling for months or possibly years and these local associations don’t have the 
backing or the financing to do that.”70 Other research confirms the gross lack of appropriate 
psycho-social and trauma counselling for women survivors in DRC; Liebling et al., in 
particular, identified the “inappropriate importation of western counselling methods for 
Congolese culture” (2012, 29). 
 
The women interviewed in this research essentially posited that a two-pronged approach is 
needed for effective de-traumatisation of women survivors. There should be specialised 
trauma counselling appropriate to their experience of complex trauma, followed by (or in 
conjunction with) other psychosocial supports; this is consistent with recognised trauma 
counselling models and feminist therapy (Dass-Brailsford 2007). Women participants also 
recognised a need for more safe spaces to enable women to come together, share experiences 
and problems, support one another, and build their collective agency: “Women should 
approach us. Because through our association, we can be relieved; because when you are 
                                                
64 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 16, 2015. 
65 Interviewed in Bunyakiri, September 26, 2014. 
66 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
67 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
68 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
69 KI FGD, interviewed in Rutshuru, April 22, 2014. 
70 KI, interviewed in Goma, April 23, 2014. 
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with other women like you, only sitting with them for 2 to 3 days will clear your concerns 
about the life you are leading.”71 
 
Although women identified psychosocial support as a key priority, they also cautioned the 
need to ensure that such support was responsive to women’s individual needs: “When we 
have to do counseling, a woman may come in a given state … they don’t all come in the same 
condition … she may come with problems which are visible/palpable while she is 
overwhelmed by others which are not visible/palpable at all.”72 Others spoke of the need to 
ensure that psychosocial support was coupled with initiatives that addressed some of their 
other needs as well (e.g. economic empowerment and education): “Her concern is to have a 
start-up capital, start some activity because she has to be self-sufficient. But you… Oh! 
Words! Words! Words!”73 
 
At the core of what women said they need to feel better is being recognised as a whole person 
with multiple needs – i.e. the need for justice to recognise that her needs are interconnected, 
and require a holistic response (HHI 2014, 13; Scott et al. 2013, e213): “First of all, we need 
to provide counseling to her … for her to get out of her current situation. Once this is done, 
we help her make income because if she has income, her thoughts will slowly and slowly be 
cleared away … That way, she will also start feeling better because she will be happy in her 
heart.”74 
 
3.2 Peace, safety, and security 
 
A key barrier identified by women to healing post-conflict, to resuming a functional and 
productive life, and to rebuilding communities, is the ongoing fear of further violence and 
conflict, and a lack of security regionally and within communities (Women for Women 
International 2010, 5). Despite the defeat of the M23 rebel group in 2013, the security 
situation in eastern DRC remains precarious as a result of the activities of numerous other 
armed groups. These include the activities of the Allied Democratic Forces in North Kivu; 
the attacks by the FDLR in South Kivu; the skirmishes between Mai-Mai Yakutumba and 
FARDC in Fizi territory; the activities of the Forces de resistance patriotiques de l’Ituri 
(FRPI) in Gety and Aveba in Ituri District, Orientale; the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 
Haut-Uele and Bas-Uele; and the spillover of FDLR activities from South Kivu into Northern 
Katanga. IDP camps have also been attacked by Luba self-defence groups called “Elements 
katangais”, and there continues to be broader regional instability in the Great Lakes area 
(UNSC 2015, 4–8).  
 
3.2.1 Peace building from within communities 
 
Many participants identified long-term peace and stability as the leading priority for justice 
for women, because it signalled a positive inflection point in resolving hardship and 
difficulties: “We first requested that WAR ends and PEACE comes back. Because we have 
noticed that the war is at the gist of all other issues. If there is no war, women will not 
experience all these issues of rape, acute poverty; war is creating poverty. Children not going 
                                                
71 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
72 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
73 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
74 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015.  
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to school … If we have peace, we will have all we need.”75 Conflict in DRC has had a 
protracted history spanning over two decades, and many younger Congolese have only 
known deprivation and conflict (Bentrovato 2014, 9–10; Christman 2010; IRIN 2007, 43). 
Insecurity and the devastation of communities has created a “chronic condition of poverty, 
unemployment, famine and malnutrition” (Bentrovato 2014, 15). Furthermore, approximately 
6.5 million people are estimated today to be in a situation of acute food insecurity in DRC 
(UN 2015, 7). Many women told of being driven off their land, losing their source of food 
and livelihood: “Before the war, we were on our native land, digging and we had livestock 
and in case you are short of money, you may sell one goat or hen and get money but here in 
Minova we hardly get a land to dig, our desire is our native land can be secure so that we 
can go back to do our farm works.”76 
 
Some women said that if peace is to be achieved, it must be initiated from within the 
community, not imposed from outside; for these women, identifying and addressing the root 
causes of conflict, such as poverty, is key: “It’s our own kids who are destroying this country 
… who decided to be rebels. … It’s because of poverty. There are some kids that go to school, 
finish their studies but they don’t get job too. So they decided to go to the bush and started 
stealing, jabbering, so they can survive.”77 Community-based approaches to peacebuilding 
recognise that the community is better placed to identify issues and needs, and to 
subsequently develop appropriate actions. This gives the community direct control over 
investment and planning decisions; such empowerment can lead to more sustainable solutions 
(Haider 2009, 4). The 2008–2010 project to integrate community empowerment and 
peacebuilding support in Ituri, backed by the UN Trust for Human Security, provides an 
illustrative example. 
 
3.2.2 Ongoing insecurity and fears 
 
Women participants frequently said that they wanted to return home, but could not do so in 
the face of insecurity; they feared for their safety, and feared that conflict could break out 
again at any time: “[I would like] that we have peace and return to our home villages … If 
there wasn’t war anymore, we could have already returned.”78 Women repeatedly described 
daily situations where they were fearful of being attacked, especially when they were 
collecting water or food, or tending to their land: “Without peace, there is nothing one can do 
because if you see women in the countryside… You are constantly concerned about the time 
you will fetch water. You are hunted by fear that they will rape you.”79 However, recent data 
suggests that many displaced people in eastern DRC have returned home; as of June 2015, 
the UNOCHA reported 1,491,769 IDPs in DRC, compared to 2,857,446 in March 2015 
(OCHA 2015; UNHCR 2015). 
 
Some women have formed “community-led initiatives for mitigating or removing the risk of 
exposure to rape … For example, women often assemble in groups when travelling to their 
farms, reporting that this decreases the likelihood of violence against them” (D’Errico 2010, 
62): “[W]omen have started cultivating in groups. … Even weeding your beans field, you 
have to do it that way because, in most cases, your field will be far away from the village. 
                                                
75 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, July 15, 2015. 
76 Interviewed in Minova, April 19, 2014. 
77 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014,  
78 Interviewed in Bweremana, April 23, 2014. 
79 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
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You invite one another within the same group to go and weed one of your group member’s 
fields.”80 
 
Rebuilding essential infrastructure, such as roads, was identified by some women participants 
– particularly those from rural and remote regions in eastern DRC – as important to achieving 
peace and security: “In our area, Bunyakiri, the road is in a very poor condition. Wars that 
we experience which are caused by armed groups … when they come looting in the 
community and we have to request intervention from the Government, even if this support is 
deployed from Bukavu … they may spend two days on the way and, in the meantime, those 
who came to loot have already looted, those who came to rape have already raped. […] As 
far as [economic power] is concerned, we have a lot of goods stuck in Bunyakiri ... You may 
have harvested maize, peanuts, and they get rotten while still in Bunyakiri because the road 
is poor.”81  
 
It is clear that women in DRC consider peace and security as core to justice; indeed, without 
them, justice may well be illusory, both for those seeking justice and those responsible for its 
administration: “We are requesting women’s security for them to be able to advocate about 
problems affecting our mates at the grass root level.”82  
 
3.3 Truth-telling and reconciliation 
 
She hides herself because she doesn’t want other people to know about what had happened to 
her; because in the world, telling the truth turns out to be a problem for you. 83 
  
Truth-telling is well recognised as a key component in transitional justice, for reconciliation 
and rebuilding communities (Hayner 2011; Amnesty International 2010, 16). The “right to 
the truth about gross human rights violations and serious violations of human rights law is an 
inalienable and autonomous right, linked to the duty and obligation of the State to protect and 
guarantee human rights, to conduct effective investigations and to guarantee effective remedy 
and reparations” (OHCHR 2006, 2). Truth telling “is critical to analysing and understanding 
the reasons and underlying causes of the cycle of violence” (Amnesty International 2011, 16; 
OHCHR 2010, 476), and is an individual and collective right (ECOSOC 2005, Principle 2). 
 
3.3.1 A muted truth of violence 
 
Many of the women with whom we spoke in DRC felt that their stories of violence and 
victimisation had not yet been heard: “You only need to shut up as you come back. You just 
don’t say anything.”84 The truth about the conflict in DRC, the brutal treatment and mass 
atrocities committed against women, and divisions forged in society, were described as 
untold or muted: “[B]efore the war we are all the same people. … [A]fter the war they 
showed us that this one is this tribe, this one is this tribe, so when you try and talk you just 
limit your language, in fact, you don’t talk everything to that person so that person doesn’t 
report everything to their tribe.”85 Women also described both a lack of processes in DRC 
                                                
80 KI FGD, interviewed in Rutshuru, April 22, 2014. 
81 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
82 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
83 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
84 KI FGD, interviewed in Rutshuru, April 22, 2014. 
85 Interviewed in Sake, September 20, 2014. 
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which acknowledged the harms and injustices they have suffered, and little by way of 
effective mechanisms to hold perpetrators accountable (see Chapter 4): “You see, she has to 
have a certain guarantee that is why most of the victims do not want to go to justice, prefer 
even not talking about it.”86 
 
3.3.2 The need for truth and to be heard 
 
A Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (2003–2007) was established in DRC to, in 
the words of the DRC Transitional Constitution (2003–2006), “promote consolidation of the 
national unity” (Article 155); to examine the political, economic, and societal conflicts from 
1960–2003; and to contribute to compensating victims (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
2002). As discussed in Chapter 4, the TRC failed for numerous reasons; despite this, the 
people of DRC believe truth-seeking is critical to the nation moving forward post-conflict 
(OHCHR 2010, 475; Vinck et al. 2008, 48). This desire for renewed effort at truth and 
reconciliation was echoed by participants in our research: “[T]hey tried to put in place truth 
and reconciliation, yes that failed for political reasons … but if we work on that again, it may 
be able to work.”87 
 
For many women, a greater openness about their victimisation and suffering will help 
facilitate women’s access to justice, and to other forms of essential support and care: “As I 
arrived here, I heard women discussing similar stories. So I told him, ‘I will not hide that I 
got raped.’ I will go ask to the other women so that I can also access to medical care. And 
that is how we got medicines. … [A]fter that, we have started telling the same thing to other 
women: ‘If such problems happens to you, please do not hide it because it is freely that you 
will get medical care if you go to the women who advocate for us.’”88 However, many 
women felt that social stigma and a lack of security operated to stifle truth and reconciliation 
in DRC: “I am living in a hidden and isolated place; I can well relate all but to whom, and 
by whom and why. Because I know the truths but security wise, I cannot tell it.”89 
 
There are numerous examples of other African nations that have implemented truth-telling 
mechanisms following damaging civil conflicts, during which SGBV occurred on a mass 
scale; these may offer lessons for DRC in its reformulation of truth and reconciliation 
mechanisms. For example, in Kenya following the 2007–2008 post-election violence, the 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) was established to investigate serious 
violations of human rights, and to put into place processes to address the needs of particular 
groups of vulnerable people (including women and children).90 Although the Kenyan TJRC is 
not without criticisms, it offers valuable insights and lessons in thinking about truth-telling 
and reconciliation through a gendered lens (e.g. in conducting hearings, taking testimony, and 
counselling witnesses).  
 
However, despite the overwhelming literature that supports the establishment of post-conflict 
truth-telling and reconciliation mechanisms for their healing effects, concerns have been 
raised, and should be considered, regarding the lack of empirical evidence on this causal link. 
In particular, a survey of women who testified in the Rwandan gacaca courts found that 
                                                
86 KI FGD, interviewed in Goma, April 18, 2014. 
87 KI FGD, Advocats Sans Frontieres, interviewed in Bukavu, September 26, 2014. 
88 Interviewed in Bweremana, April 23, 2014. 
89 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
90 See Rita Shackel and Lucy Fiske, “Making Justice Work for Women: Kenya Country Report” (unpublished 
report, 2016). 
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women survivors faced security issues in the form of harassment and threats, which only 
began after they testified (Brouneus 2008, 66). They also suffered psychological ill-health; 
for example, they would be ill in the days leading up to, and after, giving testimony, because 
they found it traumatic to relive the experiences again, and felt ashamed when they reacted 
emotionally in front of the public (Brouneus 2008, 68–9). Thus, although the social value of 
truth-finding and recording mechanisms is clear (HRW 2004, 5), such processes need to 
recognise the extensiveness of Congolese women’s (continuing) trauma, and their 
vulnerability to ongoing victimisation. Any truth and reconciliation mechanisms re-envisaged 
in DRC must be sensitive and responsive to women’s needs, offer women adequate support, 
protection and security, and must take serious account of social attitudes to rape which blame 
the victim. 
 
3.4 Compensation and economic empowerment 
 
Given that whole communities in DRC live in extreme poverty (UNDP 2014; Putman et al. 
2014), it is unsurprising that women participants viewed economic empowerment as a core 
need in rebuilding their lives. Their aspirations for economic empowerment were varied, and 
included: greater support in developing business opportunities; training and skills acquisition; 
access to financial services; livelihood security; and access to land and property: “I think that 
if you help me set up a business, I can provide for the needs of my children, they dress well, 
find school materials … As I am here, I am powerless. … But if I can set up a business, I can 
be able to raise the children to make them progress in life.”91 Assistance with setting up a 
business was a particularly acute need for displaced women starting a new life in a new 
community: “We are newcomers here in Minova and we are not known by people, we need 
loans to start a small business so that we can afford to meet the basic needs of the 
household.”92 
 
Many women stated that the violence they had experienced had harmed them emotionally, 
mentally, socially, and physically, and had impacted on their capacity to gain a livelihood and 
be productive. Many in particular said that, following rape, they could no longer undertake 
the physical work to which they were accustomed, due to injury and illness; this fact is 
further exacerbated by fear of being raped when working in the fields, which has led to 
“spiralling malnutrition and economic loss” (Pratt and Werchick 2004, 6). Data from Ohambe 
et al. indicated that the women who were the main victims of violence and sexual atrocities in 
eastern DRC were those who were the most disadvantaged and vulnerable (2005, 29). 
Women farmers were among the worst affected (2005, 33), a finding reflected in the fact that 
76% of the interviewed women for this research project were farmers; attacks on them 
contribute to reductions in their incomes, particularly if their ability to work is compromised 
by rape-related illnesses: “Since I got raped, I have no longer felt strong to work. … Before I 
would go to the field with other women, but today, when it gets 12:00, I feel very exhausted. I 
am sick every day; I am under medication every day.”93 Concurrent pillage also deprives 
them of both the means and the fruits of their production (Ohambe et al. 2005, 44). Also, 
81% of interviewees had (at most) a primary school level education, marking their already-
disadvantaged social position; this highlights the link between gender, disadvantage, and 
violence (Fiske and Shackel 2014), as losing the ability to work their land limits further 
opportunities for employment and gaining a livelihood (Feda et al. 2015, xiv).  
                                                
91 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014.  
92 Interviewed in Minova, April 19, 2014. 
93 Interviewed in Rutshuru, April 21, 2014. 
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3.4.1 Redress for harms done to women 
 
Women in DRC have been widely subjected to brutal rapes and acts of sexual violence. Rape 
is “particularly aimed at humiliating and degrading victims” (Sow et al. 2011), and often 
involves cruel and inhumane acts (Ohambe et al. 2005, 33). The accounts of rape and sexual 
violence described by women participants attest to this, including being raped in front of their 
children: “That time three soldiers came and started raping me in front of my daughter. 
After, they also raped my daughter in front of me.”94 Réseau des Femmes research also found 
that a staggering 79% of women interviewed had experienced gang rape, and that many rapes 
were accompanied by torture (e.g. genital mutilation or burning, or wounding with machetes) 
(Ohambe et al. 2005, 34–5). Many of the women participants in our research were also 
nursing multiple and severe injuries, as well as unresolved illnesses: “I am affected with the 
disease, it has never stopped. Up to now, I have some, some yellow things coming out of my 
vagina, up to now”;95 “I was beaten even with the handle of the guns and my hand was 
broken. I was trampled by feet … I’m no longer bleeding but the pains are still present in my 
belly.”96   
 
Given the extent of harm suffered by women in DRC, and the profound impact this is having 
on their quality of life and capacity to survive – let alone to thrive – it is not surprising that 
women survivors want compensation and reparation for their injuries and pain: “[M]y girl 
who was raped. They could have paid for her treatment and school fees because up to now 
after this war … she went to the hospital she was seriously sick.”97 Many women participants 
also stated that being productive and engaging in economic activity was an important step 
towards healing, and restoring dignity and respect: “You might fail from time to time, but, at 
least, you will keep trying. And, in the end, you will start feeling well in your heart. … [Y]ou 
will tell to yourself: ‘[T]he work I am doing is good!’ Then you can say: ‘[W]e are 
developing.’”98 
 
Accordingly, for many women, development of sustainable strategies for women’s economic 
empowerment is a leading priority. Many women said that they want to be independent: “A 
woman should work… she must be able to defend herself before men … Facilitate her 
schooling in order for her to acquire the required intelligence for her to be able to work for 
herself.”99 Furthermore, economic well-being was viewed as an important part of regaining 
power and obtaining justice: “If you can give me capital for business, I’ll feel free because I 
can provide for my own needs, pay for my own treatment … I’ll say I’ve had justice.”100  
 
3.4.2 Initiatives towards economic empowerment and reparations for women 
 
A great deal is being tried by way of economic empowerment programs for women in eastern 
DRC. These are mostly run by NGOs and community-based agencies, as well as international 
bodies and organisations. For example, since 2004–2005, USAID has been actively funding a 
range of initiatives in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Maniema Province through the Office of 
                                                
94 Interviewed in Minova, April 19, 2014. 
95 Interviewed in Minova, September 21, 2014. 
96 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 24, 2014. 
97 Interviewed in Bunyakiri, September 26, 2014. 
98 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
99 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2015. 
100 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 23, 2014. 
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Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), aimed at rebuilding economic, social, and political 
structures for women (Pratt and Werchick 2004). Women for Women International (DRC) 
has also served over 84,000 women in North and South Kivu since 2004, through job skills 
and rights education programs (Women for Women International 2015).  
 
Economic empowerment programs of this type are certainly delivering women some 
assistance and benefits. However, some women participants indicated that these programs are 
sometimes only of limited and short-term benefit: “If you get such a small amount, it can 
help you forget about your problems … you will have temporarily managed to feed and 
clothe your children … But when you have such a problem: the husband abandons because 
you have been raped, you remained with children whom you are unable to feed; and, at 
times, you get to a time when your landlord starts chasing you from his house … you see that 
your problem will increase and the absence of an income generating activity will bring you 
more worries.”101 It is clear, then, that women in DRC need systemic, large-scale monetary 
compensation and reparations: “You have been chased from the village; may be your 
husband does not want you anymore; you have nothing at all to restart life. And that is why 
we can say: ‘Let us establish courts everywhere in the villages but as long as there is no 
repair, I don’t know if ... this is sufficient.’”102  
 
There have been some initiatives to bring women in DRC financial compensation and 
reparations, but their efficacy remains tenuous; these are discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
3.5 Equality and protection of women’s rights 
 
Many of the women participants in DRC said it is critical for women to be better informed 
about their rights, in order to obtain justice, fight against oppression, and achieve greater 
gender equality: “The woman must know and have her rights … Because once she knows her 
rights, she will be aware that she should not be oppressed in the family. You see that 
traditional customs have kept us under oppression.”103 Considerable efforts have been made 
in DRC to promote women’s rights and gender equality (OHCHR 2014, 26; Mbabmi and 
Faray-Kele 2010, 1–2), including: steady increases in prosecutions of sexual violence; reform 
of laws that criminalise rape; the passing of a gender policy, and action plan approved by 
parliament; and capacity building activities started for the FARDC (UN Women 2012, 17). 
 
However, despite these actions, many of the accounts provided by women participants in this 
research of how they are treated within their families and communities confirm that 
traditional social and cultural norms, and discriminatory practices, continue to oppress 
women in DRC today: “So let us also speak what we do not experience: The right to work… 
the woman has no right to work; the woman has no right to education; she has no right to 
study; and to stand as a community chief; there is nothing of that sort at all which we have 
the right to.”104 
 
There is widespread agreement in gender development and justice circles that more needs to 
be done to educate women about their rights – in particular, about sexual violence laws and 
issues of gender equality (Mansfield 2009, 407). The women in this project view education of 
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women, children, and entire communities as being pivotal to the protection of women’s 
rights: “I would like to ask you to keep on teaching us, may be this rape issue will end. … 
because if a neighbour was attempting to rape, a man or other people in the bush, when they 
hear the teachings or we, after being taught by you, may be this will be reduced in the 
area”;105“Those who are educated are busy with their jobs and take care of their families 
and don’t have time for wrong doing. But others who did not go to school will do all sorts of 
bad actions.”106 
 
There is also a growing consensus within program development that men and boys need to be 
specifically targeted and involved in sensitisation programs on women’s rights, to maximise 
their potential positive effects (Fanning and Hastie 2012, 9). Some argue that the reach of 
these programs need to go further, including making gender-sensitivity training “an ongoing 
aspect of professional development for all public servants”, as part of the need for “a 
transformation in societal norms and attitudes towards women” (Medie 2012, 99–100). 
 
3.5.1 Women’s participation in public life 
 
Recent data reveals that women in DRC are not well represented in many spheres of public 
and national life, with limited participation at decision-making tables. In 2013, only 8.3% of 
seats in the DRC Parliament were held by women (UNDP 2014). In the justice sector,107 only 
19.5% of employees were women. The District Courts and High Courts were 20.4% 
composed of women, while the percentage is 12% for the Appeal Courts and Department of 
the Prosecutor General, and 6% for the Supreme Courts of Justice and Department of the 
General Prosecutor. Thus, not only are women underrepresented in the judiciary writ large, 
this underrepresentation gets more severe the higher the level (GNWP 2014, 10–11). 
 
Although women have a labour force participation rate of 70.7% – comparable to the men’s 
rate of 73.2% (UNDP 2014, 4) – it is important to query the areas of employment. For 
example, women constitute less than 3% of state-waged employment, compared to 12% of 
men (Mbambi and Faray-Kele 2010, 2); instead, women are primarily employed in 
agriculture and the informal sector (ECOSOC 2009, 15), where there is little “legal 
protection, social security or other benefits” (OHCHR 2013, 10). Women also generally earn 
less than men (Mbambi and Faray-Kele 2010, 2; CEDAW 2013), and their exploitation in the 
mining sector has also been raised as an issue (CEDAW 2013); 1 in 4 women in mining 
towns identify as sex workers. 
 
The status of women in DRC, as reflected in the data presented above, is inconsistent with 
DRC’s national and international obligations to promote gender equality and women’s and 
girl’s advancement (Mbambi and Faray-Kele 2010, 2). Nationally, for example, the 
Constitution of the DRC mandates states to ensure equality of gender representation at 
national, provincial, and local levels (Article 14). Article 13.3 of the Electoral Law 06/006 
also requires that candidate lists “take into account” gender equity; however, they are not 
rendered invalid if they fail to do so. Internationally, relevant obligations include the 
Convention on the Eradication of Discrimination Against Women (to which the DRC is a 
party), and the African Women’s Protocol (ratified by DRC), a specific protocol to the 
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African Charter that covers several aspects of women’s rights; these include a right to 
political participation (Article 8), and equal protection before the law (Article 9). The DRC 
has also committed to UN Security Council Resolution 1325, a resolution on women, peace, 
and security. 
 
Women’s poor participation in public life, including in political spaces, education, and 
employment, was a strong concern raised by many women and key informants in this 
research. Numerous women participants recognised the need for more women to be involved 
in political and decision-making spaces, and to fill higher-level and more powerful positions; 
they voiced their hope in seeing women as Infirmier Titulaire (‘Senior Nurse’) and managers 
of office work,108 as “magistrates, barristers, judges, legal advisors”,109 and as “ministers, 
provincial deputies as well as national deputies … that continue to advocate for us at higher 
levels”.110 
 
3.6 Justice for children 
 
Every woman participant in DRC – indeed, in all three of the research countries – saw justice 
for women as being closely connected to justice for children. Therefore, the clear nexus 
between women’s wellbeing and economic empowerment, and children’s potential to thrive, 
must be addressed in transitional justice responses (UNFPA and UNICEF 2011). 
 
3.6.1 Poverty, abandonment and the costs of children’s education  
 
Crippling school fees were widely mentioned by women participants as a site of injustice for 
women and children. According to research conducted by the World Bank Group, based on a 
Household Budget Survey (HBS) and at the primary level of education, families in the 
poorest quintile pay 42% of their per capita consumption per child educated, compared to 
only 6% for the richest quintile. International comparison also shows that the DRC’s 
spending on education as a share of GDP (1.8%) is inadequate and lagging, especially 
compared to the sub-Saharan African average of 4.6% (Feda et al. 2015, 40). Investment in 
children’s education is critical in a transitioning DRC, both to empower women and to 
rebuild healthy communities. Every extra year spent in education is associated with higher 
earnings, as well as increased chances of gaining more stable contract employment (World 
Group Bank Education 2015, xiv); for every year that a girl spends in school, she increases 
her family income by 20% (CARE 2015). 
 
As mentioned above, the devastating impact of sexual violence often included abandonment 
by husbands, and consequent ostracism from the broader community. As a result, most 
women raped during the conflict in DRC have been left with sole responsibility for the care 
of their children, and sometimes the children of deceased family; they have been left to feed, 
clothe, and educate these children with no support (FIDH 2013, 67). Many women in DRC 
are today the head of their households – many children are born and reared in single mother 
families (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2005). In many instances, women are 
caring alone for several school-aged children, including children born of rape: “One of my 
brothers in law promised to bring me at his place but the day he heard that I was raped, he 
never come to my place up to now … he does not know in which conditions my children are 
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living because I have 6 children, all of them are girls, so he does not know the way I am 
living.”111  
 
It is clear in speaking with participants in this project that women are strongly committed to 
caring for their children, but most women described resultant extreme hardship. Women were 
very distressed by not being able to adequately provide for their children: “And going mad 
for this woman is due to the fact that she has become poor. If she had some income, she 
would not be so traumatized become she would then be able to meet her children’s needs and 
make them grow well without difficulties.”112 Women are not offered much assistance by 
family members or the community, both because hardships generally prevail in communities, 
and because of the strong stigma attached to rape and fear of HIV/AIDS: “There is rejection 
from the neighbours: ‘This one will infect us with Aids,’ they will tell one another.”113 This 
link between financial constraints and non- or incomplete schooling is a matter of concern, as 
deprivation of education in children is associated with lifelong adverse impacts (OHCHR 
2010, 326). 
 
3.6.2 De-traumatisation of children 
 
Women also identified an urgent need for children, like women, to be de-traumatised as a 
priority. Many children in DRC are deeply traumatised by having experienced and witnessed 
many forms of violence, for protracted periods of time; thousands have been traumatised 
directly fighting in the war as child soldiers (OHCHR 2010, 326–47). Trauma continues 
today because of ongoing violence in communities and families, discrimination, widespread 
poverty, and general poor living conditions. The impact of this trauma is far-reaching, and 
may “hinder the children's ability to deal with and overcome emotions of hate and revenge. 
Likewise, the children with PTSD symptoms might regard acts of retaliation as an 
appropriate way to recover personal integrity and to overcome their traumatic experiences” 
(Pierre Bayer et al. 2007, 558). 
 
Poverty creates immediate barriers to the development and wellbeing of children, and also 
affects the child’s capacity to realise their potential and contribute to society in the future. 
This engrains a vicious cycle, a “hidden bombshell”: “People prefer children who go to 
school and view with suspicion those who don’t. They know that such children become easily 
bandits. These are the ones who rape around here.”114 Many women also spoke of harsh 
mistreatment of children who are unable to attend school: “OK, so kids that are in school are 
playing some game together, the one who is not in school tries to join the game. Are they 
rejected? Yeah they just insult him, discriminate him and there’s a way that they talk to him – 
‘that you are just nothing, you just there a fool – you end up in the road.’”115 Difficulties 
with discrimination and lack of education are particularly problematic for displaced children: 
“They do not go to school because of poverty. We are getting nothing since the time we 
became internal displaced people”;116 “They are differently treated at school in comparison 
to those who are not refugees. They call them street children. This is not good for 
children.”117 
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Even at school, children are faced with poor conditions which are not conducive to learning 
and well-being. Student-teacher ratios, by Western standards, are high; in 2013, the student-
teacher ratio for primary schools was placed at 37.1:1, while the ratio in secondary school is 
14.2:1 (due to fewer children being able to access higher education) (UNSECO 2015). 
Furthermore, classes are poorly resourced; students often are required to share textbooks and 
materials with a number of other students. Only 8.4% of public schools in 2013 had access to 
electricity; 40.8% to potable water; and almost 30% of schools lacked access to toilets 
(UNESCO 2015). Teachers are also poorly paid and work in difficult circumstances, adding 
to the troubled learning environment (Global Partnership for Education 2015). 
 
3.6.3 Perpetuating cycles of disadvantage 
 
Many women said that seeing their children educated is one of the most important things they 
would like to achieve: “I would like to die seeing that they are already established so that 
they could say: ‘Even though our mother has died, she gave us the best.’”118 However, due to 
financial constraints, they are often forced to make choices about which child(ren) will be 
schooled, which induces pain and guilt: “Each child should have shoes, uniform, school bag 
while yourself have nothing to do. This makes it harder to the time that you decide that some 
of them give up while others keep on. The one you ask to give up, feels bad and thinks you 
hate him/her while you are yourself feeling bad when seeing him/her not going to school.”119 
Other women described “proportioning” school within household expenses, to ensure that 
each child has at least the opportunity to learn the basics of reading and writing: “[T]he 
eldest one went to school. He stopped at five primary. The other one at fourth primary. Then I 
worried that both of them, they know how to write and how to read so I had to stop them so 
that others also could go to school to know at least how to write and to read.”120 
 
Girls are disproportionately disadvantaged in such decisions, particularly if they have been 
raped: “On seeing that the child has already been taken to the forest (raped), she will not be 
motivated to spend money on the child any more. There is discouragement on the part of the 
family and as for the child; she will be rejected by the community.”121 The disadvantage and 
inequality faced by girls in education is exemplified in a swathe of statistics; among them, 
literacy at age 15 is documented as being 78.1% for boys, compared to 50% for girls, while 
the school life expectancy for males is 11 years, compared to 8 years for females (CIA 2015).  
 
Dropping out of school for girls increases the risk of lifelong poverty, and is associated with 
early age marriage and pregnancy (UNICEF 2013b, 10). Ntoimo and Odinegwu (2014, 1154) 
reported that less than 1% of single mothers in Sub-Saharan Africa had a tertiary education. 
Low-level education is associated with low wage and income capacity, the majority of 
women in the present study were either not employed, worked in the agriculture sector, or as 
petty traders. This “stresses the precarious economic situation of women … and highlights 
the need to empower women” (2014, 1154) and young girls.  
 
The inextricable link that is revealed between the well–being of women and children points to 
the need for holistic well–integrated multi–system transitional justice policy that is 
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responsive to the individual needs of women but which also recognises the broader context of 
women’s lived experiences and the separate yet at times overlapping needs of women and 
children and the intergenerational impacts of conflict, violence and disadvantage. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: JUSTICE RESPONSES 
 
 
What you do for me, but without me, is against me. 
(Ce que vous faites pour moi mais sans moi, vous le faites contre moi).122 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the law and justice framework in DRC, and examines 
the barriers to accessing justice for women considering both formal and informal justice 
channels. More specifically, the chapter examines the efficacy of transitional justice 
strategies and mechanisms, implemented in DRC since 2006, in meeting women’s justice 
needs. 
 
4.1 Overview of law and justice framework in DRC 
 
DRC’s functioning as a civil law country draws many of its characteristics from the Belgian 
legal system, having received its law from Belgian colonialists. At the apex of DRC’s sources 
of law is its Constitution (Constitution de la Republique du Congo 2006), which primarily 
draws upon French and Belgian laws. The current Constitution was brought into force on 
February 18, 2006, with amendments to eight articles made in 2011 that expanded the State’s 
and the President’s powers (Roberts 2011). Furthermore, under Article 220 of the 
Constitution, a number of legal structures have been entrenched, including: the republican 
form of the state and the representative form of the government; the principle of universal 
suffrage; the number and duration of presidential terms; the independence of the judiciary; 
political pluralism; and freedom of association. Other sources of law in DRC include 
international treaties and agreements; legislation (divided into ‘ordinary’ and ‘organic’ laws); 
case law; custom; doctrinal writings; legislation; and administrative regulations (Zongwe et 
al. 2015).  
 
4.1.1 International obligations 
 
The DRC is a monist state; article 207 of the Constitution states that duly ratified 
international treaties and agreements prevail over Congolese legislation. The DRC is a party 
and member to a number of regional human rights instruments, including several which 
specifically recognise and seek to protect the rights of women and survivors of sexual 
violence; these include the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes 
Region (including a Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression of Sexual Violence Against 
Women and Children), and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol). Furthermore, under the Rome 
Statute, the DRC government in 2004 referred the ICC to investigate and prosecute 
international crimes that had occurred in DRC since 2002 (ICC 2015a); to date, six DRC 
individuals have been prosecuted in the ICC, and two accused have been convicted and 
sentenced. 
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4.1.2 Customary law 
 
Customary law operates alongside the civil law system in DRC; however, the Constitution 
has ascribed it a subordinate role relative to statute (Article 207). These customary laws only 
apply to the traditional or local communities from which they originate, and do not 
encompass criminal offences (IBAHRI and ILAC 2009, 25).  
 
In trying to access formal justice, victims face many barriers, including complex 
impenetrable processes; procedural barriers (e.g. payment of transport, processing fees and 
legal services); the likelihood of perpetrators not being able to afford to pay damages even on 
court order; and the risk of shame and re-victimisation (Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada 2012). With so many barriers to formal justice, victims of sexual violence often elect 
(or are forced to use) customary law mechanisms rather than pursue formal legal actions; for 
example, arbitration or mediation involving community leaders and/or family may be used to 
settle a grievance between a victim and perpetrator. Following such processes, remedies may 
be offered, such as the giving of money, or other reparations to the victim or their family; this 
can include forcing the victim to marry the perpetrator, in order to repair the family’s honour 
(Aho et al. 2013, 20–21): “It all ends in disaster for her... She is no longer a person to live 
in/with the Society. She is rejected and when she has delivered, she will either be obliged to 
marry the perpetrator – her rapist – no matter whether she loves him or not, or she is asked 
to remain in her home but do farming work. … ‘'Getting pregnant is for her the end of the 
world,’ one would say.”123 These types of solutions are problematic to the rule of law, as they 
ignore the fact that there has been a criminal offence; furthermore, while the family receives 
the reparation, the forced marriage operates as a continuation of the punishment for the 
victim. Police often encourage victims to engage in such processes, and then receive payment 
for their role in such mediations (Aho et al. 2013, 21), what results is the perpetuation of a 
cycle of violence and inequality: “[I]n some areas when the man has not the dowry, he 
arranges to rape a girl knowing that the raped girl will be given to him and then dowry will 
come maybe later and what is amazing is that parents agree with that. First there was rape 
and then forced marriage.”124 
 
4.1.3 Penal law 
 
Under Congolese criminal law, crimes are referred to as “infractions,” and, unlike in a 
common law system, a victim is able to pursue both a criminal claim and a civil suit (Aho et 
al. 2013, 12). The Penal Codes consists of two books – one for general infractions, and the 
other for specific infractions; these two books can be further subdivided into two sections – 
the ordinary penal code covering civilians, and the military penal code. 
 
Criminal procedure rules are contained in the Penal Procedure Code. In 2006, amendments 
(Law No. 06/018 of 20 January 2006) to the Penal Code and the Code of Civil Procedure 
introduced more progressive definitions of sexual offences, in response to the sexual violence 
epidemic (Zongwe et al. 2015). Law No. 06/018 raised the age of minority in rape from 14 to 
18 years of age, thereby providing a more comprehensive definition of rape. However, the 
amendments have not been effective, as they are at odds with other laws and cultural norms; 
most notably, the minimum age of marriage for girls under Family Code is 15 years of age 
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(Article 352). Moreover, “the law covers sexual violence that may occur in the domestic 
sphere, but because Congolese culture does not recognize spousal rape, women do not report 
it” (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). Article 467 in Book III of the Family 
Code also applies the infraction of adultery unevenly to spouses; while a woman is 
punishable in all circumstances, a man is only punishable if he induced the adultery (UNECA 
2012). 
 
Several key informants we interviewed in this project highlighted multiple areas where the 
penal law is deficient, and fails in its application to deliver women the justice to which they 
are entitled. As one key informant summarised: “There has been the adoption of a new law, 
of a new legislation, that should complete not only the penal procedures but also the penal 
law … [However] it has been observed that there were false victims … [and victims] go there 
while all the community looks at them as false authors. The second fact, always regarding to 
massive violence, in the community, it is not easy to identify oneself as a victim of sexual 
violence for there are so many consequences… [Thirdly], reparation is almost null if not null 
when you have a look on all the condemnations that have been made by both the civil and 
military courts. ... Thus, it has been observed that this justice, as it has been tackled in this 
law, favours penal sanction than making reference to the recovery of damage and advantage 
mechanisms ... Then, people quickly were finding solutions in families than going to the 
court.”125 
 
4.1.4 Private law 
 
Private law is primarily covered by the Congolese Civil Code, which consists of three parts: 
the law of the persons, property law, and the law of obligations. The law of persons is 
covered by the Family Code, which consists of five books covering nationality, persons, 
family, succession, and ancillary matters. The object of the Family Code is to bring the rules 
around families and persons in line with Congolese culture which conceptualises the 
individual through his or her social group (Zongwe et al. 2015); as such, family law and the 
law of persons are contained in the same code. It if of note that the Code prohibits child 
marriages, but sets the minimum marriage age at 18 for boys and 15 for girls; this explicitly 
sits contrary to Article 11 of the Constitution, which provides for equal rights for all human 
beings.  
 
4.1.5 Judicial system 
 
DRC’s judicial system is one “which is struggling to meet the needs of the population” 
(IBAHRI and ILAC 2009, 7). The UN Special Rapporteur, reporting on the independence of 
the judiciary, identified a lack of resources and corruption to be the two key factors in judicial 
failure to follow up on judgments (UNHRC 2008a, 11–14). Article 149 of the Constitution 
states that the judiciary is independent of the Executive and Legislative Powers, while article 
151 reinforces the division of powers by preventing the executive from issuing injunctions, 
such as orders to limit or halt an investigation. In practice, however, “justice is controlled by 
the executive: the government makes appointments and transfers magistrates as they see fit” 
(Amnesty International 2011, 37). The executive continues to instruct judges, and sometimes 
refuses to enforce court decisions; findings show that only about 30% of judgments are 
enforced (IBAHRI and ILAC 2009, 23). On severe underfunding, two female magistrates 
from Goma explained that “there are no operating costs … I just take an example … the little 
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money of operating costs, the disbursement fees, it is with that money that we do everything, 
we purchase the pens, reams of papers … we work with many difficulties.”126 
 
The new Constitution in 2006 re-devised the judicial system. There are now three 
jurisdictions: Judicial (civil and criminal); Administrative; and Military. Appeals from these 
first instance courts go to their respective Courts of Appeals, before passing to the separate 
high courts. The previous Supreme High Court has now been reformed into three separate 
high courts: the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court for 
administrative matters. In 2009, new provisions also required that juvenile tribunals be 
established in each town and territory.127 However, although the reformed version of the 
judicial system looks promising on paper, DRC has struggled to implement the changes due 
to severe underfunding, and the structure largely remains unchanged; the Supreme Court 
remains as the final court of appeal (IBAHRI and ILAC 2009, 17–18). Despite this lag in 
reform, however, the mobile court program (discussed below) has been of some success. 
 
The military justice system is a broad jurisdiction; rather than being ad hoc, it is expressly 
established by Article 149 of the Constitution. Although Article 156 limits the jurisdiction to 
determining infractions of Armed Force and Police Nationale Conglaise members, the 
jurisdiction also captures civilians who have committed international crimes (crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and genocide), as defined under the Rome Statute; this is due to the ill-
alignment of the Military Judicial and Penal Codes with the Constitution (IBAHRI and ILAC 
2009, 29; Aho et al. 2013, 13). The system follows its own military judicial code and military 
penal code, but suffers from similar problems to the civilian jurisdiction – it lacks funding, 
infrastructure, support from central government, and training (IBAHRI and ILAC 2009, 30; 
Amnesty 2011, 39). A high proportion of human rights infractions are committed by the 
national police and the armed forces (UNHRC 2008b), but conflicts are inherent: 
 
Military magistrates are both army officers, who are subject to military command, and 
members of the Congolese judiciary. … [Also], the Military Justice Code explicitly requires 
that the highest ranking judge on a bench must be of equal or greater rank than the accused. 
Since the highest ranking judge in the country is a Brigadier General, officers with higher 
rank in the army are in practice immune from prosecution. (Amnesty 2011, 38–39) 
 
The Police Nationale Conglaise have jurisdiction over the entire nation, and are responsible 
for public safety, property security, law and order, and the security of senior government 
officials (Constitution, Article 182); however, reports suggest that national police lack the 
knowledge of how to handle criminal investigations. Where a sexual violence case has 
occurred, problems often arise at the outset, in the investigative stage; victims are often 
unable to recognise their attackers due to it being a gang rape, or they are unable to identify 
whether the attackers were from DRC armed forces, rebel groups, or international personnel 
(Aho et al. 2013, 23): “I couldn’t [report] because this happened at night. I did not know 
who to accuse because I did not know – I had not identified them. It was a night looting. I 
could not accuse people I did not know.”128 Investigations are also often set back from the 
delay between the occurrence of the attack and investigators being able to enter the site 
safely; this can mean that vital evidence is lost or destroyed (Aho et al. 2013, 23). It has also 
been reported that victims are often unaware that their case has been tried and damages 
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awarded; conversely, perpetrators may not know that they have been tried and convicted until 
sometime afterwards (Aho et al. 2013, 27). 
 
4.2 Access to justice 
 
Women participants in DRC identified numerous barriers to women’s access to justice, 
particularly access to formal and legal justice. Justice generally was described by the women 
in this research as remote, both geographically and in design. They also described being shut 
out of justice processes due to financial barriers; corruption; a lack of accountability; lack of 
expertise and resources; and complex, intimidating, and gender insensitive processes. 
 
4.2.1 Formal and legal justice 
 
A 2004 audit commissioned by the European Union found that only 20% of the population 
had access to the formal justice system in DRC (cited in Savage and Kambala 2008, 337). 
Women participants who had accessed or tried to access formal legal justice in DRC 
repeatedly described a system unresponsive to women’s needs that failed to engage with 
women: “I do constantly ask myself: ‘I am fatherless; they have taken/received letters and 
letters (written complaints), but I have never seen any reaction.’”129 The general weaknesses 
and deficiencies of the legal system, and of formal justice as a whole, have already been 
mentioned. 
 
It is also well recognised that only a small proportion of perpetrators of rape and sexual 
violence in DRC are ever held to account for their wrongdoing. For example, data from Heal 
Africa showed that, of the 2672 victims identified, only 165 prosecutions (6 per cent) were 
initiated (cited in Mansfield 2009, 378); the proportion of prosecuted cases of sexual violence 
that end in a conviction represent an even smaller number of cases (Aho et al. 2013, 18). 
Furthermore, the number of cases prosecuted is only a small number of the actual cases of 
rape and sexual violence, as “many instances of sexual violence are not reported” (Mansfield 
2009, 378). 
 
4.2.2 Lack of knowledge and understanding of justice processes 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, many women participants said that they lacked knowledge and 
understanding of their rights, and of the complex and incomprehensible processes of justice 
more broadly. Consistently with these issues, Mansfield’s study found that most interviewees 
did not know where their cases would be heard, and did not understand fundamental legal 
requirements such as the need for proof to succeed in a case (2009, 384–85). 
 
Some women in this research described feeling alienated by a justice system and officials that 
lacked sensitivity to women’s needs: “Here the distance between where the woman lives and 
where she can go for justice … let’s take the case of a woman who was raped who has a 
problem. She is from Bunagana. For her to get to the OPJ Office … Well … the Rutshuru 
Office is 80 km far away.” 130  Many of the women we interviewed said that they felt 
unsupported in their attempts to access justice, at multiple levels and sites: “It is not about 
being supported in one way only. It is rather through all ways meaning health support, 
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mental support, and financial support. … You know that in order for me to know how to read 
and write I have to pay! All that must be included in the pack required to support the woman 
in DRC.”131 
 
Women’s alienation from the justice system in DRC is arguably exacerbated by the 
previously-mentioned weak participation by women as actors within justice processes; 
consequently, survivors who do interact with the justice system will infrequently interact with 
female justice professionals: “Women to become magistrates, barristers, judges, legal 
advisors … Those solutions that we identified must help us with regard to our complaints as 
women.”132  
 
4.2.3 Stigmatisation and fear of reprisals 
 
As previously mentioned, survivors of sexual violence often decide not to seek justice 
because of a fear of being stigmatised, as well as feelings of shame and humiliation: “In our 
village, a woman who was raped is a stigmatized woman … really!  Every one mocks her; 
every one!’”133 The lack of protection mechanisms in place for victims, such as judges’ 
failure to redact victim names from depositions, can only be detrimental to remedying this 
lack of reporting (UNJHRO 2014, 22). This feeds into a cycle in which a lack of outcomes 
are visible, and no reparations are being made, leading victims to often feel that the public 
exposure and shame risked by going to trial is essentially “for naught” (Aho et al. 2013, 29).  
 
Additionally, many women also do not report or pursue justice due to a fear of reprisals from 
either the alleged perpetrator(s), and/or from police and corrupt justice officials (UNHCR 
2010, [922]; HHI 2009, 48; FIDH 2013, 54): “The justice system is really corrupted even if 
someone is arrested, he just says ‘I will give my money and be released and once released I 
will kill you.’”134 Almost half of the victims interviewed by Mansfield identified fear of 
reprisals as an obstacle to prosecution (2009, 395). Clearly, women need to be protected 
when they attempt to access justice; otherwise, they will continue to choose not to disclose, 
or to pursue justice. 
 
4.2.4 Cost of justice and corruption 
 
Many women described financial disadvantage and the high monetary cost of justice as 
barriers to accessing justice: “People are discouraged because they know in advance that 
they cannot afford the justice fees and prefer to stay home and forget the case.”135 Survivors 
in Mansfield’s study also identified high costs as the most prevalent barrier to prosecution, 
with approximately 70% identifying it as an issue (2009, 392). 
 
As documented by participants, the costs of justice arise from multiple sources. Firstly, there 
are “legitimate” costs imposed by the justice process, including costs attached to summonses 
and to securing evidence, such as medical reports and certificates (Mansfield 2009, 393). 
Post-trial processes can also be expensive; victims are required to first pay US$15 for a copy 
of the judgment, and 6% of the reparation in order to enforce the judgment (FIDH 2013, 60). 
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Often, victims cannot afford the travel costs associated with attending various offices and 
courts, particularly if they have urgent expenses such as health care (Mansfield 2009, 393). 
Women are often unaware that some of these costs can be waived, and judicial staff may not 
encourage such practices because of their own shoe-string budgets (Amnesty International 
2011, 31).  
 
Additionally, women trying to access justice may be faced with additional costs borne of 
corrupt processes. Deep-rooted corruption in the judicial process in DRC is well documented, 
ranging from judicial staff taking bribes for the implementation of warrants, overruling 
sentences, changing decisions, and allowing escape from prison (Amnesty International 2011, 
39–41); a key contributor to this corruption is the poor pay and working conditions of justice 
officials. Many women participants identified the resultant disadvantage, which favoured 
financially better off perpetrators. Accounts of accused persons buying their freedom were 
told over and over again by women participants: “Your voice will never be heard … they will 
not do anything to him because he has his money. He will give part of it and go back his 
way.”136  
 
4.2.5 Distance of justice 
 
As mentioned earlier, formal justice was not accessible to many women participants due to 
the physical distance between her and legal actors and organs: “It is often times is so far 
away but it’s just not this, you can’t leave your family and go all the way to Goma and try to 
pursue a case because if you get here, where will you stay, who is gonna feed you where will 
you sleep?”137 Many women in DRC live in remote and isolated areas, for whom ongoing 
security issues can also present a challenge (Oxfam 2015, 1). This issue of distance is 
exacerbated by the fact that judicial proceedings are often fraught with delays. The duration 
of proceedings, from entry of the case into court until the delivery of the final judgment, 
lasted on average 142.9 days, despite legal stipulation that trials should only last three months 
(UNDP 2011, 50).  
 
The distance to obtaining justice may also give rise to other challenges that may diminish the 
quality of justice processes, and ultimately impact on the outcome of justice for some. 
Judicial actors may be limited in their capacity to travel around the country to perform their 
duties, due to a lack of adequate resources (UNHCR 2010, [912]). Moreover, legal clinics 
and NGOs are generally located in towns, and may be inaccessible to those from remote areas 
(UNJHRO 2014, 21). Finally, distance may pose challenges for investigation, gathering, and 
preserving evidence; despite awareness campaigns around the fact that presenting for 
treatment within 72 hours of rape will give the “best chance of preserving medical evidence”, 
distance is one of the factors that can prevent victims from obtaining treatment within that 
time frame (Redress International 2012, 9). The majority of women in eastern DRC do not 
live within four hours walking distance of a hospital, or other medical facility (Johnson et al. 
2010, 559).  
 
4.2.6 No outcomes from justice 
 
Many of the women participants stated that, even if they are able to access justice and have 
their case heard, justice failed them because it did not deliver anything to them: “[W]e were 
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out of energy, starving and finally you benefit nothing from the trial.” 138  MONUSCO 
reported that, in 2010–2011, fewer than one in ten prosecutions resulted in a judgment (2012, 
20). Poor outcomes in a case pose difficulties for individual complainants, in terms of 
disappointment, upset, and lost time and costs: “[I]n the end, after victims have undergone a 
complex process and risked shame, humiliation and fear of reprisals, they ultimately receive 
nothing. This causes re-victimization and discourages other victims from filing similar cases” 
(Aho et al. 2013, 17). 
 
4.2.7 Towards better access to justice for women – mobile courts 
 
We now turn to what is arguably one of the most productive developments for gender justice 
in DRC, in closing the distance between women and justice – specialised mobile gender 
courts. While few of the women with whom we spoke had direct experience of the mobile 
court system, several key informants identified mobile courts as an opportunity for greater 
justice for women: “[T]he mobile courts which are now organized in the villages … I think 
that that is a good opportunity because those women all alone could not have referred that 
matter to justice, but because it was these are things which happened to everybody’s 
knowledge, there were organizations in place which knew it and which denounced the cases. 
Today, these are proceedings going on in regular legal formalities. It is a real opportunity 
for women.”139  
 
With DRC’s rugged terrain, and many isolated areas unconnected by roads and infrastructure 
(OSISA 2012, 12; Khan and Wormington 2011, 17–18), a mobile court scheme which would 
enable formal judicial institutions to come to those most isolated from their workings was 
thus identified as a priority for justice in the Ministry for Justice’s 2008–09 “Roadmap” 
(IBAHRI and ILAC 2009, 26). Mobile courts are expressly authorised under the Constitution 
(Rispo 2014, 18; Khan and Wormington 2011, 19), and are wholly Congolese innovations, 
introduced into the legal system as early as 1979 (Rispo 2014, 9). The specific goal of mobile 
courts is to improve access to justice for women and communities in remote and regional 
areas; however, international donors have specifically developed and implemented mobile 
gender courts to prosecute SGBV; the most prominent donors include Avocats Sans 
Frontières (since 2004), and the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative (in 
collaboration with MONUSCO, HEAL Africa and Panzi hospitals) (since 2008). Mobile 
gender courts now operate in North and South Kivu, and Maniema (Maya 2012, 34; Rispo 
2014, 9).  
 
Trial procedures are the same between mobile and fixed courts (OSISA 2012, 19; Aho et al. 
2013, 14), but mobile courts are formed on an ad hoc basis. Statistically, their work turnover 
has been impressive; for example, ABA ROLI conducted more than 80 mobile courts in rural 
areas of North Kivu, South Kivu, and Maniema provinces, between 2009 and 2014; this 
allowed more than 1100 cases to be heard (ABA 2015, 26). In 2008–2012, it facilitated 
nearly 900 rape trials in both mobile and “brick and mortar” courts. 60%–75% of the cases 
heard by these mobile courts are rape cases; other crimes include instances of robbery and 
pillaging (Rispo 2014, 10; Maya 2012, 34). The conviction rate has remained steady at 
roughly 60% in both military and civilian courts (Maya 2012, 34). 
 
                                                
138 Interviewed in Minova, April 19, 2014 
139 Interviewed in Goma, April 24, 2014. 
37 
 
Perhaps the landmark mobile court case, organised by the Tribunal Militaire de Garnison de 
Bukavu in Walungu, South Kivu, remains the 2012 trial for the Fizi rapes, during which a 
mobile court prosecuted the only defendant (Lieutenant Colonel Kibibi Mutuara) who might 
otherwise have attracted the attention of the ICC (Maya 2012, 35). However, the tale was not 
so optimistic in another major case, the Minova rape trial (2013), during which 14 lower-
ranking officers and 25 rank-and-file soldiers of the FARDC were put on trial in Goma, on 
charges including war crimes, rape, and various other military offences. Despite over 50 days 
of hearings in Goma and Minova, only two of the rank-and-file soldiers were charged with a 
single rape each; the high-level commanders with overall responsibility were never charged, 
and the lower-ranking officers were all acquitted (HRW 2015c, 1–2).  
 
For the purposes of considering gender-sensitive transitional justice initiatives, it is important 
to note mobile courts’ active integration with other services. In addition to funding mobile 
courts, ABA ROLI supports 15 legal aid clinics in eastern and central DRC, which provide 
services primarily to survivors of SGBV Between 2008 and September 2014, these clinics 
provided legal counselling to 18,081 survivors, and helped file 10,110 cases with local 
civilian and military authorities; this has resulted in 1748 trials and 1225 convictions (ABA 
2015, 23–24). Mobile courts may also be linked with non-legal organisations, to provide 
medical, social, and economic assistance to victims and conduct community education 
activities; medical assistance, in particular, is usually provided to survivors through a series 
of partnerships with organisations such as HEAL Africa and Panzi Hospital (Khan and 
Wormington 2011, 19).  
 
Mobile courts have been broadly praised as a whole for being professional and efficient 
(OSISA 2012), and “unquestionably deliver[ing] on their undertaking to bring justice to the 
remote reaches of eastern Congo” (Klosterboer and Hartmann-Mahmud 2013, 69). They are 
building judicial capacity in DRC more broadly, and have aided in the public image of the 
justice system as they are less likely to be susceptible to bribery and corruption, given that 
they are organised and monitored by international organisations (IBAHRI and ILAC 2009, 
26–27).  Importantly, it has also helped to sensitise communities to the issues and life 
challenges surrounding sexual and gender based violence, thereby helping to reduce stigma 
for women survivors of such violence (OSISA 2012, 28–30).  
 
4.3 Informal and traditional justice 
 
Many participants advocated that effective justice for women necessitated a more holistic and 
integrated approach which includes both formal and informal justice measures and responses, 
appropriate to women’s needs. Indeed, participants frequently spoke about their interaction 
with informal sites of justice, including through health care and the church. 
 
4.3.1 The role of the church in delivering justice to women in DRC 
 
Many women viewed the church as an agent of justice, a core pillar of community, and a 
source of social support for women: “I’m in a church, it’s a group in the church. In that 
group we just pray, we pray for each other.”140 The church was also frequently depicted by 
women participants as a core pillar of community and a source of social support within the 
community for women “I’m in a church, it’s a group in the church. In that group we just 
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pray, we pray for each other … and as I have that problem with my kids – they came to my 
house and they pray for my son and we pray for other people every Saturday.”141 
 
Informal mechanisms established within churches have been seen to play a role in delivering 
justice within communities. For example, the Comités des Sages and Communautes 
Ecclesiales Vivantes in the Roman Catholic Church support community reconciliation 
(Kamwimbi 2008, 371); such structures “have the power to collect complaints from the 
victims and to help promote reconciliation,” borrowing from traditional mechanisms of 
mediations, negotiations, conciliation, and reparation (Kamwimbi 2008, 371). Kelly et al. 
(2012, 294) also found that assistance from the church (in such forms as micro-credit and 
counselling) was seen as helping couples stay together after sexual violence. That said, 
churches were also at times a site of ostracism for survivors, and both men and women 
highlighted the need for broader education, pointing to religion’s “potential to change the 
culture of repudiation” (Kelly et al. 2012, 294). The need for broader education was 
confirmed in the present study with some participants stating that at times some within the 
church had advised them to persevere and keep quiet about their experiences of rape and 
domestic violence. Other participants mentioned that churches sometimes excluded those 
from other denominations from assistance.  
 
4.3.2 Customary and traditional justice in DRC 
 
While the customary courts created under colonial rule were replaced with Tribunaux de Paix 
(Peace Courts), and magistrates replaced local people of import as judicial decision-makers 
(Kamwimbi 2008, 362), many areas in DRC – particularly rural areas – still use chiefs as 
judges. These tribunals have been criticised as using “retrograde” customs, discriminating 
against women, and lacking accountability in terms of compliance with international 
principles of law and justice (Kamwimbi 2008, 362–63). Other traditional systems of justice 
that operate in villages typically involve elders mediating and resolving disputes; these 
mechanisms focus on “reparative justice, forgiveness and reconciliation” (Kamwimbi 2008, 
363). 
 
Compared to participants in Uganda and Kenya in this project, relatively fewer women in 
DRC talked about their interactions with customary and traditional forms of justice. 
However, some women described traditional justice as antecedent to formal justice: “[W]hen 
you have conflict you can go to local leaders, such as those leading a group of ten families, 
Chiefs of quarters, chiefs of localities that hear you. If he cannot find a solution, you bring 
the case to police.” 142  Women most often use traditional and community-based justice 
processes in relation to family and land disputes;143 however, traditional justice practices may 
have been weakened by the displacement of people away from their homes and communities: 
“[R]eport to whom, we were displaced from the village and all the houses of the village were 
burnt.”144  
 
However, informal justice may be seen by younger Congolese women as a feature of the past, 
connected more to their parent’s generation than their own. Many women with whom we 
spoke expressed disappointment with the lack of support and assistance they received from 
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within their communities in resolving disputes: “If my community would help me, I wouldn’t 
come here and tell you again that I have this need.”145 Perhaps traditional, communal, and 
customary practices in DRC have themselves fallen prey to the effects of protracted violence, 
community disintegration, and corruption (Kamwimbi 2008, 363–64). Some women 
participants certainly described traditional justice processes as faltering, or sharing the same 
shortcomings as formal justice processes: “The traditional system is there but it is not a clear 
system, it is the different processes within it… and the thing which make women difficult to 
access to the traditional system is money. I think you have to pay some of these people.”146  
 
Traditional justice processes may also perpetuate social and cultural norms and practices that 
posit women as chattels, and serve to entrench gender inequalities. Female genital mutilation, 
discriminatory inheritance laws, and using cultural practice as a defence to crime (Kamwimbi 
2008, 363; Fielder 2013), are just some of these norms and practices. As with formal justice, 
women also provided examples of their exclusion from informal justice processes: “The king 
called the priests, pastors, and directors of schools, they went all there for the meeting but for 
us we can’t know what they talked about because we don’t have our husbands … there was 
no women.”147 In response, some new informal community-based systems of justice have 
sprung up, with women banding together to address justice issues within their community: “I 
will give an example. When we have discovered that there is a woman that wants to 
jeopardize our group, we call a meeting, we talk. There, we provide her with pieces of advice 
and if she finds that she were about to destroy the group, then she apologizes and conforms 
herself to the group’s norms.”148 However, even these processes – driven by women, for 
women – may sometimes exclude other women: “I was in [a] women’s association and we 
were requested to cultivate onions and all of us cultivated the onions and during the harvest 
time, I was ill and they sold all the harvested onions, they did not give me anything, I was so 
disappointed and this is the reason that I decided not taking part to any women 
organization.”149 
 
Women participants’ reluctance to use informal and community justice mechanisms accords 
with the findings of Scott et al. (2013), who found in their survey of 998 adults in four eastern 
DRC provinces, that the majority of respondents favoured the legal system over community 
mediation to obtain justice for SGBV; despite this, 61.1% of SGBV survivors nevertheless 
reported being forced to accept community mediation (2009, 391). An earlier study 
conducted by Oxfam, however, found that almost all the interviewees had more confidence in 
resolving their problems through local or traditional mediation mechanisms (including 
traditional authorities and civil society-supported structures, such as local peace committees 
and the Church) than through police and other justice institutions (2012, 22). 
 
4.4 Transitional justice 
 
Broadly speaking, transitional justice strives for accountability, reconciliation, and redress for 
victims in the aftermath of massive human rights violations, following periods of political 
turmoil, state repression, or armed conflict (Domingo 2012, 3; Olsen et al. 2010a, 11; 
OHCHR 2010, 447). Often, transitional justice operates within a context “marked by 
devastated institutions, exhausted resources, diminished security and a traumatised and 
                                                
145 Interviewed in Minova, September 21, 2014. 
146 KI, interviewed in Goma, September 26, 2013. 
147 Interviewed in Bunyakiri, September 26, 2014. 
148 Interviewed in Rutshuru, September 22, 2014. 
149 Interviewed in Rutshuru, April 22, 2014. 
40 
 
divided population” (OHCHR 2010, 447). A key concern of transitional justice is “to restore 
dignity to the victims of human rights violations through the establishment of provisions for 
justice, truth and reparation for the wrongs they have suffered” (OHCHR 2010, 447).  
 
The DRC has had limited success in its transitional justice efforts, particularly when 
evaluating those efforts from the perspective and experiences of women impacted by violence 
(CEDAW 2013); indeed, participants commonly did not know what transitional justice was, 
or found it difficult to provide examples of successful transitional justice initiatives in DRC: 
“[W]hen there is conflict, the formal justice is really kneeling before and hardly works … so 
there are no formal mechanisms organized to manage the transition until the restoration of 
the justice system … which is why at the community level, there is still a malfunctioning 
justice system … there are still wounds which are not yet healed because through the 
transitional justice, we can heal some wounds in the community but the transition failed.”150 
Even those who did have some knowledge or experience of transitional justice in DRC were 
of the predominant view was that “[t]hose institutions are there but they have not performed 
well.”151 Factors that have rendered transitional justice efforts impotent at a national level 
include: non-recognition of the Government in some areas of the country; inadequate 
resourcing of transitional justice processes and mechanisms; diminished human resources 
resulting from low and lacking educational standards; power-sharing agreements in post-
conflict security arrangements; and a lack of political will (Hall and LaRocco 2012, 5; 
OHCHR 2010, 450; Davis 2013, 289–90).  
 
4.4.1 Judicial responses 
 
As attested to by many women participants in this research, judicial responses have been 
inadequate. Only 39 prosecutions “connected with an armed conflict or committed as part of 
a widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations” have been identified over the 
period 2009-2014 (Candeias et al. 2015, 3). The majority of these cases (27) involved SGBV, 
charged as crimes against humanity and/or war crimes, and including rape, mass rape, and 
sexual slavery; however, only 11 saw a conviction and sentence follow (Candeias et al. 2015, 
41–67). In many of these cases, investigations faltered or were suspended, and no trial 
resulted; even in those cases tried, the inadequacies of the judicial system in DRC are 
evident, with the Minova case (RP 003/2013 and RMP 0372/BBM/013) providing a key 
example of these multiple deficiencies. However, it should be noted that this trial did exhibit 
commendable aspects, including the fact that the military judges conducted proceedings 
effectively, and, together with prosecutors, applied relevant international laws and principles 
(HRW 2015c, 3). This is encouraging, given the concerns that have previously been raised 
about Congolese judges lacking knowledge on international law and human rights (UNHCR 
2010, [915]). 
 
Nonetheless, it is clear that if victims in the DRC are to obtain the justice they deserve, the 
prosecution of serious crimes (in particular, rape and sexual violence) needs to form part of a 
clear strategy directed towards ending impunity. 
 
 
 
                                                
150 KI interviewed in Goma, April 18, 2014. 
151 Interviewed in Rutshuru, April 21, 2014. 
41 
 
4.4.2 Proposal for mixed chambers 
 
Some of the challenges faced by the Congolese courts in prosecuting serious crimes may be 
addressed through the use of mixed chambers (HRW 2011, 3). There have been numerous 
proposals for such chambers in DRC, made by international donors, Congolese civil society 
organisations, the Human Rights Watch, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.  
 
According to both Human Rights Watch (2009a, 2) and the DRC Country Manager for the 
Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (quoted in Lee 2012), the main rationale for using 
mixed chambers to try war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide is two-fold. 
Firstly, the nature and prosecution of these crimes is complex; consequently, “including 
international experts with knowledge about how to handle complex criminal investigations, 
prosecutions and trials” can help overcome the difficulties faced by national judiciaries that 
lack experience with these types of cases (HRW 2009a, 3). Secondly, existing attempts to 
prosecute these crimes have been plagued by political interference and institutional weakness. 
The integration of international expertise and resources is therefore seen as a means of 
promoting impartiality and fairness in the judicial process, and a way of supporting judicial 
reform within DRC. 
  
The proposed structure and operation of mixed chambers in DRC 
 
In support of a speech by President Joseph Kabila to both chambers of the DRC Parliament in 
October 2013, the cabinet of the Minister of Justice and Human Rights prepared a draft law 
on the use of mixed chambers (also referred to as “specialised courts”) (HRW 2014a). 
According to HRW (2014a), the proposed chambers: would be a domestic tribunal embedded 
in the nation’s appeals courts; would only have “jurisdiction only over war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide”; and, for the initial years of the chambers, would have 
present international staff with extensive experience in prosecuting international crimes. 
According to a U.S. Department of State (2014) briefing on mixed courts, there would be a 
majority of Congolese representatives on the court at both trial and appellate levels; 
international staff would provide on-the-job training to national staff, and reinforce the 
independence of the chambers from potential political and/or military influence.  
 
Arguments for and against mixed chambers in DRC 
 
Support for mixed chambers has not been unanimous. A report compiled by Rightslink 
(2011) for the Club des Amis du Droit du Congo (CAD) examined the experiences of mixed 
courts in Bosnia, East Timor, Cambodia, and Kosovo, and noted that the proposal for a mixed 
chamber in the DRC raises some concerns. In addition to previously stated concerns about 
the capacity of the DRC judicial system (for which mixed courts could present an additional 
burden and drain of resources), the Rightslink report noted the following issues. Firstly, there 
is the question of whether the court will possess jurisdiction over the armed forces; there 
exists a concern that Article 91 of the proposed legislation might be used to exclude 
jurisdiction over military personnel (HRW 2014a). Secondly, there is an issue of a lack of 
consistency between the text on the specialised court, and the draft legislation for the 
implementation of the Rome Statute (including on the permissibility of the death penalty). 
There is also a question regarding whether or not to include international judges, or if the 
chambers should be limited to Congolese nationals (Rightslink 2011, 71; HRW 2009a, 9).  
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Additionally, the UN Mapping Report 2010 highlighted that any such court should establish 
that amnesties granted for crimes under international law do not apply before it (OHCHR 
2010, 473). To date, there have been three amnesty laws in DRC, and a presidential decree. It 
is unclear how many people in total have been granted amnesty in DRC, but at least a 
thousand have been granted amnesty under the 2014 laws (US Department of State 2014; 
AFP 2015a). 
 
Whether mixed chambers will be implemented in DRC is yet to be seen. If the establishment 
of mixed chambers does eventuate, it is imperative that the court ensures it is gender-
sensitive, and deliberately shaped to meet the needs of women. 
 
4.4.3 International Criminal Court  
 
Arguably some successes in prosecution of serious crimes in DRC have been seen at the 
international level. The Congolese government in 2004 referred to the ICC the investigation 
and prosecution of international crimes that have occurred on DRC soil since 2002. The ICC 
has to date prosecuted six individuals from the DRC (Thomas Germain Katanga, Callixte 
Mbarushimana, Sylvestre Mudacumura, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Bosco Ntaganda, and 
Lubanga Dyilo), and two (Katanga and Lubanga) have been convicted. However, none have 
been convicted on the grounds of rape-related crimes, despite five of the six cases prosecuted 
including charges of rape; in Katanga’s case, the acquittal on charges pertaining to rape and 
sexual slavery were seen as “a devastating result for the victims/survivors of the Bogoro 
attack as well as other victims” (Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice 2014, 1). 
 
Some commentators have questioned the effectiveness and appropriateness of the ICC in 
delivering justice to the people of DRC, particularly to women survivors of sexual violence 
(Lake 2014, 25–27; Lee 2012). The ICC had up until earlier this year not convicted any 
individual of rape or crimes related to sexual violence. The DRC cases (especially the 
Katanga case) demonstrate the pragmatic difficulty of bringing prosecution for sexual crimes 
to the ICC. Arguably, they have contributed to the invisibility of sexual violence in the DRC; 
this risks further perpetuating discrimination against women (Breton-Le Goff  2010, 24–25). 
However the recent decision of the ICC in The Prosecutor v. Jeane-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
(ICC-01/05-01/08) offers new hope. In March 2016, former Vice-President of the DRC, 
leader of the Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), and Commander-in-Chief of its 
military branch, the Armée de Libération du Congo (ALC) – was found guilty of a series of 
offences perpetrated in the Central African Republic (CAR) between October 26, 2002 and 
March 15, 2003, including rape, as a crime against humanity (Art. 7(1)(g)) and as a war crime 
(Art. 8(2)(e)(vi)) ICC-01/05-01/08-3343 [752]). Perhaps the judgment’s greatest promise is in 
establishing a precedent for the ICC to prosecute sexual crimes in conflict settings marking 
“the first time that the ICC has convicted someone for rape as a war crime” (Amnesty 
International 2016; Women’s Initiatives for Gender Justice 2016). The Chamber during 
sentencing was quick to point out that the highest sentences it imposed were the 18 year 
sentences for rape crimes (ICC-01/05-01/08-3399 [95]). The judgment has been praised for 
sending out a clear message, 
that impunity for sexual violence as a tool of war will not be tolerated … that military 
commanders and political superiors must take all necessary steps to prevent their 
subordinates from committing such heinous acts and will be held accountable if they 
fail to do so. (Amnesty International 2016) 
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Many of the women participants in this research were either unfamiliar with the ICC, or 
doubted its value: “[s]o, what will I go to the International Criminal Court if already at the 
local level; I did not get any solution?” 152  This was a view also echoed by some key 
informants interviewed in this project: “[women] really feel discouraged about the ICC 
process because they are raped, they know that FDLR soldiers raped them but the ICC is 
saying that they don’t have evidence.”153 Generally, however, key informants recognised that 
whilst “not important for local areas … it is a good thing to have arrested rebellion heads 
such as Bemba, Ntaganda, and we wish others had been captured and judged … [because] 
there is a culture of impunity here, so that is why the ICC could be useful.”154 
 
4.4.4 National reparations 
 
As previously noted by women participants, reparations are an important part of transitional 
justice; they “provide justice to victims and contribute to the construction of justice and peace 
… they can serve as an apology to victims, as a public acknowledgement of crimes, as an 
acknowledgement of state responsibility for such violations, as a way to subvert the structures 
of subordination that might have led to the violations of rights in the first place, or as services 
to victims to mitigate impacts of abuse” (Aho et al. 2013, 20). In the DRC, “the types of 
reparations awarded are always monetary or punitive. Victims in the DRC usually are not 
aware that apologies and non-monetary compensation are available to them as reparation, nor 
is it common for actors in the field to institute such options” (Aho et al. 2013, 21–22). 
 
The DRC government has discussed a draft law for the establishment of a fund to allow the 
State to pay reparations to victims of rape and sexual violence (CEDAW 2013, 3); however, 
progress on this seems to have stalled indefinitely. Congolese courts have also ordered the 
government to pay victims compensation in at least eight cases in which those convicted were 
members of the Congolese military (Parmar and Mushiata 2012, 2). The only known payment 
of compensation for rape by the DRC government occurred in 2014, when 30 victims of the 
2003 mass rape in Songo Mboyo received financial compensation from the Government; 29 
victims received the equivalent of US$5000 as compensation for rape, and US$200 for looted 
property. The mother of one of the victims who died from complications of rape received the 
equivalent of US$10,000 (UN Secretary-General 2015, 8–9).  
 
Regardless of this breakthrough, post-trial administrative procedures (e.g. the requirement to 
pay 6% of the total reparations granted, in order to enforce the judgment) continue to present 
problems for issuing reparations. Furthermore, in 2013, the Minister of Justice told FIDH that 
she had requested 44,633 million Congolese Francs to discharge 150 cases; only 0.7% of the 
amount requested was made available (FIDH 2013, 61). However, the Trust Fund for Victims 
(TFV), created under Article 70 of the Rome Statute and funded by various states, offers 
some hope for future court-ordered reparations to victims in DRC cases before the ICC. A 
mandate for paying reparations is activated once there is a conviction, with a subsequent 
order for reparations. In the Lubanga and Katanga cases, the ICC also requested and heard 
submissions from the TFV on proposed implementation plans for collective reparations (ICC 
2015b). 
 
 
                                                
152 KI FGD, interviewed in Rutshuru, April 22, 2014. 
153 KI, interviewed in Goma, September 26, 2013. 
154 KI, interviewed in Goma, September 26, 2013. 
44 
 
 
4.4.5 Institutional reform and governance 
 
Institutional reform (of police, armed forces, courts, monitoring bodies) is widely recognised 
as a key element of effective transitional justice policy because it dismantles the “machinery 
of abuses and prevent[s] recurrence of serious human rights abuses and impunity” (Domingo 
2012, 4; ICTJ 2015a). In 2013, 11 countries in the Great Lakes Regions signed the 
Framework Agreement for Peace, Security and Cooperation in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and the Region. This agreement committed signatories to taking concrete steps to put 
an end to recurring cycles of violence, and facilitate the administration of justice through 
regional judicial cooperation (Candeias et al. 2015, 1–2). It named five institutions to be 
established in DRC in its transition to democracy: a truth and reconciliation commission; a 
national human rights observatory; a high authority for media; a national electoral 
commission; and a commission for ethics and the fight against corruption. However, DRC’s 
attempts to establish these core institutional pillars towards democratisation have largely 
failed. 
 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission  
 
As previously discussed, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), presided over by 
Bishop Jean-Luc Kuye Ndondo wa Mulemera, was established in DRC (July 2003 – February 
2007), with a mandate to “promote consolidation of the national unity” per Article 155 of the 
Transitional Constitution. Articles 154–160 tasked the Commission with deciding the truth 
among conflicting versions of history, and promoting peace, reparation, and reconciliation. 
However, it was criticised because many members had informal ties with those implicated in 
the crimes examined (US Institute of Peace 2003), and members’ vested interests in ensuring 
that the crimes and atrocities committed by their respective groups were overlooked inhibited 
the TRC’s functioning. Furthermore, it was “underfunded and largely ignored” (OHCHR 
2010, 478), and it failed to discharge its duties: to negotiate reparations between different 
factions, under Article 41 of the Transitional Constitution; and to investigate atrocities, hold 
any public hearings, or take witness statements to establish the truth about the conflict and 
violence (OHCHR 2010, 478). Only recently have reparations been paid to any victims, and 
these are grossly inadequate (UN Secretary-General 2015, 8–9). 
 
If a future TRC is to be established in DRC, its independence must be guaranteed and it must 
be resourced properly so as to be able to carry out its mandate. The UN Mapping Report 
(OHCHR 2010) suggested some basic principles for establishing a future TRC. Firstly, there 
must be broad consultation, including with victims and civil society. Secondly, the TRC 
should have a precise and realistic mandate, limited to periods of history where the most 
serious violations occurred; moreover, this mandate should not extend to providing mediation 
or reparations. The process of selecting members is also paramount, as this will determine the 
body’s legitimacy; it must command the trust of the people. On this, the possibility of a future 
TRC having international membership has been raised (OHCHR 2010, [68]). Its composition, 
structure, and processes must also be sensitive to the needs of women, and promote women’s 
participation, agency, and voice. 
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The National Human Rights Observatory 
 
The National Human Rights Observatory (NHRO) was established under Law 04/20 of July 
2004, as an independent and autonomous body with a judicial personality. However, 
“[p]olitical interference could be seen in almost all of its work and it was accused of being 
biased towards the government. The agency was only located in Kinshasa due to resource 
constraints and had few full-time staff. Staff appointments were based on political 
considerations. Periodic reports of the agency mainly documented human rights abuses rather 
than actions taken against such abuses by the agency” (African Democracy Encyclopaedia 
Project 2009). The NHRO did little by way of transitioning DRC to democracy, or 
recognising the rights of women survivors of sexual violence. It has been defunct since July 
2006. 
 
The Ethics and Corruption Commission  
 
The Ethics and Corruption Commission (ECC) was established in 2003 to “raise awareness 
of ethical issues and fight against corruption, increase the capacity of national institutions to 
promote integrity; ensure that all national institutions involved in the fight against corruption 
have adequate operating capacity; investigate violations of ethical values and corrupt 
activities; and promote transparency in the political parties,” per Articles 154–155 of the 
Transitional Constitution (Chêne 2014). The ECC engaged in a series of activities, including 
conducting a survey of legal professionals that sought to ascertain their knowledge of current 
anti-corruption laws. It examined formal complaints or denunciations, and conducted 
investigations into allegations of corruption. It organised workshops to familiarise the public 
with the Anti-Corruption Law, and the Code of Ethics of Public officials. It also coordinated 
with other major state bodies to repress corrupt activities (including breaking up a corruption 
network, and uncovering tax evasion by state and private enterprises) (Kodi 2008, 57–62). 
 
Like other attempts at institutional reform, the ECC was crippled by major resource and 
logistical problems, weak leadership, in-fighting between various bodies, nepotism, 
insufficient technical expertise, and lack of independence, so that it was not carried over into 
the 2006 constitution (Chêne 2014, 8).  
 
4.4.6 Corruption and security sector reform 
 
These failed attempts at institutional reform are clearly highlighted by the little mention made 
of any of them by the women participants in this project. However, widespread corruption 
and lack of accountability and governance at an institutional level were identified by many 
women in this project as a barrier to women and communities obtaining justice in DRC. 
Many of the women and key informants with whom we spoke recognised an urgent need for 
wide-ranging and effective institutional reform: “There are no mechanisms in place to follow 
for justice officials, they can do what they want. ... There needs to be justice sector reform – 
the state needs to take this seriously, the international community needs to put a lot of 
pressure on the government to reform the system.”155 A number of key informants identified 
poor working conditions for civil servants and justice sector professionals as a major 
contributor to this corruption: “The OPJ has no State matriculation number… His salary is 
just ‘Corruption.’ He, himself never receive those 60,000 Congolese Francs.” 156 
                                                
155 KI, interviewed in Goma, April 23, 2014 
156 Interviewed during Validation Workshop, June 15, 2014. 
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One of the key pillars of action for DRC noted in the Sun City Agreement was “to continue, 
and deepen security sector reform, particularly with respect to the Army and the Police” (2). 
Security sector reform (SSR) is not only needed to address harms that the civilian population 
continue to suffer at the hands of the military, but has been identified as fundamental to 
eliminating human rights violations and ending the humanitarian crisis, stimulating growth 
and development, and keeping regional conflicts in check (Eastern Congo Initiative 2012, 8). 
Two overarching reasons have been identified as causing the ineffectiveness of SSR in DRC: 
firstly, a lack of political commitment from the Congolese government, and secondly, poor 
coordination of assistance from donors (Eastern Congo Initiative 2012, 8). Some of the main 
priorities for more effective SSR include streamlined coordination, vision, and oversight 
within the international community; a whole-government approach (including proper 
engagement by the DRC government with MONUSCO); appropriate disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) processes; and devising practical and realistic plans 
and benchmarks that can be implemented to achieve sustainable peace (including addressing 
the issue of gender mainstreaming) (Eastern Congo Initiative 2012, 10–21). 
 
It has been suggested that the Congolese government’s non-commitment to SSR comes down 
to the government not wanting a professional and effective military (EIC, 8). Given that, for a 
long time, military power equated to political power, military reform would pose threats to 
the entrenched interests of those wielding power, and to the government’s sovereignty 
(Clement 2009, 18; Eastern Congo Initiative 2012, 8; Davis 2009, 18). As a result, military 
justice has never ranked high on the SSR agenda (Clement 2009, 12). It has both failed to 
protect the civilian population, and manifested a cycle of corruption owing to insufficient 
funding of the army, poor prison facilities (Davis 2009, 15, 18), and lack of implementation 
of any strategic plan (Clement 2009, 13, 18; Eastern Congo Initiative 2012, 9). In fact, it is 
unknown how many members the armed forces has, or their identities (Davis 2009, 18). 
Inadequate wages for soldiers and police which are frequently unpaid (Eastern Congo 
Initiative 2012, 9) has also meant that these personnel often take matters into their own hands 
(e.g. by extorting the civilian population, illegal taxation, and forced labour) (Clement 2009, 
13). 
 
Prior to 2006, international efforts had been mostly coordinated by the International 
Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT). However, since then, the Congolese 
government has refused to establish a successor body, rejecting it as unacceptable (Eastern 
Congo Initiative 2012, 13). Since 2006, the efforts of international donors have been 
piecemeal, and thus unsustainable (EIC, 3); this failure to coordinate has been due to the 
culture of secrecy, different approaches to SSR, and refusal by the Congolese government to 
coordinate with its SSR partners (Clement 2009, 15–16; EIC, 10). Any cooperation that came 
about was usually ad hoc, bilateral, and related only to specific issues (Clement 2009, 15). 
 
The piecemeal approach of SSR is also mirrored in the DDR process. What has resulted has 
been described as something of a “republican army,” where incompetent or abusive soldiers 
have been absorbed rather than dismissed (Clement 2009, 10). Vetting procedures, which are 
intended to screen and exclude those who have committed human rights abuses, have been 
mostly non-existent and have resulted in top ranks of the army being filled by perpetrators of 
human rights abuses (Clement 2009, 13; EIC 25). It has been suggested that the processes 
that have been employed have encouraged the worst perpetrators to elect to stay with the 
army, over demobilising (EIC, 17). Despite this, there has been surprisingly little in-fighting, 
given the different origins of the soldiers (Clement 2009, 20).  
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Another issue that has been highlighted as lacking in SSR approaches is gender 
mainstreaming (Clement 2009, 14). Given the high proportion of female victims and 
underrepresentation of females in the army, it has been suggested that increasing the number 
of female personnel in the Congolese army and within international actors, and implementing 
fast-track procedures for females to rise in army ranks, might help combat gender-based 
violence (Clement 2009, 14–15). Indeed, women participants and key informants in this 
research both strongly recognised the need for women to widely be recruited as part of broad 
institutional reform: “As for the police, we have been giving favors to women as far as 
recruitment is concerned, we made sensitization campaigns asking the beautiful women that 
are already in the police to go to different universities so as to sensitize women so that they 
can enrol the police.”157 
 
According to a key informant, however, some reforms are already underway in DRC within 
the security sector, to focus on ensuring police are well trained and sensitised to anti-
corruption values and attitudes: “But, we have initiated so much internal reform wishing to 
change the mentality of the police, reminding them that they are issued from the population, 
as I have come from the population, and that they will get back to the population at the end of 
their police career. So, I am not the population antagonist, but a servant of the population. … 
We have observed that they understand and that there is already so much change as far as 
they are concerned and the population more and more trusts us.”158 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
This research project spoke to 113 women impacted by violence, from the Goma and Bukavu 
regions of the DRC. The methodology of this project was deliberate in situating women’s 
feelings, thoughts, and experiences of justice at the centre of the research, and in recognising 
women’s agency; this was to ensure that women could be heard, to have themselves and their 
experiences acknowledged and validated. By voicing women’s views and experiences 
regarding their justice needs, and highlighting such catastrophic consequences of violence as 
physical disability, discrimination, deprivation and social exclusion, a key message arose that 
gender-sensitive justice, to be effective, must be holistic rather than atomistic.  
 
Justice must take account of the complex social, economic, cultural, and political context 
through which women are exposed to an intersecting web of harms; it needs to incorporate 
legal, psychological, economic, and politico-cultural remedies, as well as allow increased 
participation for women in the justice and political spaces of their society. Together, these 
will better enable women to live fulfilled, dignified lives, free from violence and with 
opportunities to nourish future generations. Accordingly, the following recommendations are 
proposed. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
157 KI, interviewed in Kinshasa, October 2–3, 2013. 
158 KI, interviewed in Kinshasa, October 2–3, 2013. 
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5.1 Recommendations 
 
To the Government of DRC: 
 
• The women of DRC need formal State commitment to the development of justice 
processes that are well resourced and supported in terms of expertise, personnel, and 
infrastructure. More specifically, barriers that impede women’s access to justice – 
including the cost of justice, distance of justice, gender insensitive, and overly 
complex and corrupt processes of justice – need to be reformed. Justice should be 
made affordable, comprehensible, transparent, and in all respects accessible to all 
women. 
• A strong political will to realise compensation and reparations for the women of DRC 
is required. Provision should be made for the immediate payment of court ordered 
compensation and reparations to women survivors. A national victims’ 
compensation/trust fund should be established, from which reparations can be paid to 
women survivors of sexual and other conflict-related violence, in advance of future 
justice mechanisms. 
• Investment in transitional justice processes that are gender sensitive, holistic, 
coordinated, and integrated towards meeting women’s needs are also called for by the 
women of DRC. 
• Peace and security must be prioritised by the Government of DRC, with a strong 
commitment towards ensuring non-recurrence of conflict and mass violence 
perpetrated against women, children, and communities. Management of its natural 
resources should be an important element in DRC’s peace and security agenda. 
• The culture of impunity for sexual violence must be urgently addressed. 
• Ongoing institutional reform of government and the justice and security sectors 
should be pursued at all levels. 
• Transparent, fair, and independent processes towards truth and reconciliation – 
processes which would enable women’s voices and agency to be recognised – should 
be established. In establishing such a mechanism, the protection of women witnesses 
must be assured, and truth-telling mechanisms need to be linked to reparations and 
other transitional justice mechanisms (including prosecution where appropriate), 
lustration, and institutional reform. 
 
To the international community: 
 
• The ICC should continue its indictment of those responsible for the mass atrocities 
and breaches of human rights in DRC.  The processes of the ICC and its outreach 
activities should be gender mainstreamed and sensitive to the impacts of violence on 
women. 
• Governments of donor nations and inter-governmental organisations should maintain 
pressure and lobby the Government of DRC for more national prosecutions of 
perpetrators, as well as the development of compensation and redress schemes that 
recognise the harms suffered by women and their lived experiences. 
• International agencies and NGOs should commit to delivering to women services and 
programs that feed sustainable economic, cultural, social, and political empowerment 
of women in DRC. 
• Pressure should be applied by the international community towards the development 
of a robust truth and reconciliation process for the people of DRC. 
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For service delivery and programming: 
 
• Quality psycho-social and trauma counselling services are needed to assist women 
and communities with healing and recovering from conflict and violence. Such 
services should be tailored to respond to the needs of women, both in terms of 
complex trauma intervention and less acute trauma, including depression and anxiety. 
These services need to connect and integrate with other types of services and 
programs (e.g. economic empowerment and training programs for women). There 
also needs to be recognition of the link between women’s trauma and wellbeing, and 
the corresponding wellbeing of children. 
• Women and children need to be supported in access to all levels of education. 
• Programs that empower women, and which genuinely recognise women’s agency and 
voice, need to be propagated. Women need and deserve sustainable services and 
programs that are tailored to their needs, not just to political or funding agendas. 
• Service delivery and programming for women needs to be holistic – recognising 
women’s multiple needs, and available to women in a coordinated and integrated way. 
 
Transitional justice in DRC needs a strong, multi-levelled scaffolding, innervated by 
strategies to transform the lives of women towards improved health, well-being, 
empowerment, and self-fulfilment. Government, civil society, and communities must work 
together on multiple levels in policy development, law reform, service and program delivery, 
to ensure that justice is served for the women of DRC.	
 
 
